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REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE
SYNDICATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
The utilization of the real estate syndication as a form of invest-
ment has skyrocketed in recent years.' On its face the vehicle offers
benefits to all concerned: the syndicator can achieve one hundred per-
cent financing and often can receive excellent profits with relatively
little personal risk;2 the investing public is attracted by the prospect of
real estate ownership with its tax shelter, cash flow and capital appre-
ciation benefits. 3 Unfortunately, the attraction of syndication for both
the syndicator and the investor often results in an investment euphoria
which does not provide the proper environment for important invest-
ment decisions in an area as complex as modern real estate. 4 This
euphoria can often lead to imprudent purchases of property at prices
inflated by tax shelter considerations and artificial demand, 5 the sy-
phoning of exhorbitant compensation by syndicators6 and confusion
In the first five months of 1972, tax shelter plans accounted for over 22% of new
security offerings by member firms of the National Ass'n. of Securities Dealers. The
Infighting to Reform Tax Shelters, Bus. WEEK, Jun. 10, 1972, at 62. Oil and gas, cattle
and real estate are the predominant tax shelter investments. Forty-nine real estate
syndicates offering $401,700,000 worth of real estate limited partnership interests were
listed in Nov., 1972, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION DIGEST.
2. The real estate syndicator normally can get 75-80% financing of the total cost;
secondary financing can cover up to 90%. The balance represents the equity portion
and is funded by the sale of limited partnership interests. The syndicator as a general
partner is personally liable, see note 20 infra; he can insulate this personal liability by
using a corporate general partner, see note 19 and accompanying test infra.
3. See text accompanying note 16 infra. See generally Rosenblatt, The Real Estate
Syndicate: Snag in Tax Shelters, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6 [here-
inafter cited as Rosenblatt]; Berger, Real Estatd Syndication, Property, Promotion,
and the Need for Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725, 733-35 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Berger] and M. SELDIN & R. SWESNIK, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 19-39
(1970).
4. See note 7 infra. See also Hayes & Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Estate Equi-
ties, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 86, 92 (1972).
5. See note 34 infra. The ever present admonition for those contemplating invest-
ment in real estate limited partnerships is to invest only where there is sound economic
justification for the investment. Tax shelter should always be secondary. Speech by E.
Bruckner, Marketing Syndications, D. AUGUSTINES & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE
SYNDICATIONS 343-48 (1972).
6. One recent syndication plan filed with the SEC called for promoters to keep
sixty-seven cents of every dollar raised from investors. Rosenblatt, supra note 3.
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on the part of the investor as to exactly what is happening with his
money. 7 Too often the aftermath is the collapse of the syndicate and
loss of the investment. 8
The predictable consequence of investor losses and excessive pro-
moter profits stemming from use of an unfamiliar investment mecha-
nism in the real estate investment area has been a clamor for regula-
tion!" In response, several states have either enacted or proposed stat-
utes or regulations which will increase substantive regulation of real
estate syndications and will buttress the more traditional forms of
Blue Sky disclosure regulation. 10 In contrast, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has recently completed a study which concludes that
real estate syndications should continue to be solely regulated pursuant
to the disclosure policies of the Securities Act of 1933. although there
7. Id. at 1. col. 6. Rosenblatt relates a classic example of a disastrous lack of
investor understanding of the real estate syndicate. Investors, including many local doc-
tors and business executives, were approached by promoters with the amazing proposi-
tion of achieving tax shelter and income without putting up any money. The investor
merely signed a document which arranged an unsecured loan of $15,000 for investment
in the syndicate. The investor did not even have to go to the bank or speak to a loan of-
ficer. Loans were so easy to secure that "Lawrence Grey. a Hawthorne dentist, obtained
his . . . loan while fixing somebody's teeth." The investors acquired an interest in one
of many separate syndicates which owned properties such as hotels, apartments. shop-
ping centers, office buildings and convalescent hospitals. The various investments were
allegedly of poor quality: "The prices paid for the properties 'were grossly in excess of
fair market values . . . . Many of the properties were not only not operating profit-
ably at the time of their acquisition, but had never operated profitably ... ' " The in-
come from the various projects and separate syndicates was pooled: bills for all syndi-
cates were paid out of the same account. When cash became short, the promoters merely
started up a new syndicate. Finally, the losing properties became too much to carry and
foreclosures resulted. There was not enough money to make payments on the investors*
bank loans and the bank finally demanded payment from the borrowers. The kicker was
that all of the investors were general partners in the syndicates and therefore were per-
sonally liable.
8. United Professional Planning, a Los Angeles real estate syndicate filed a bank-
ruptcy petition in July, 1972. The syndicate had 2,500 investors who had invested $20.-
000,000 in UPP's 72 syndications. Rosenblatt, supra note 3. See also The Infighting to
Reform Tax Shelters, Bus. WEEK. Jun. 10. 1972, at 62; You Pays Your Money, Takes
Your Losses, Seattle Times, Oct. 8, 1972, at E6.
9. See generally Berger, su pra note 3; Hayes & Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Es-
tate Equities, 50 HARv. Bus. REV. 92 (1972); The Infighting to Reform Tax Shelters,
Bus. WEEK, Jun. 10. 1972, at 62.
10. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(e) (McKinney 1968): WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32-
010 et seq. (1972); Midwest Securities Commissioner's Association, Statement of Policy
Regarding Real Estate Programs, [Current] BLUE SKY L. REP. § 4821 (Adopted Feb.
28, 1973). In addition, the National Association of Securities Dealers has proposed
sweeping regulations for tax shelter programs. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC., TAX SHELTER PROGRAMS, Proposed Rules of Fair Practice. Art. III, § 33.
A revised set of Proposed Rules was recently published for public scrutiny and com-
ment by the SEC. (See note 230 infra.).
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apparently will be radical changes from past disclosure requirements. I'
This comment will attempt to make some sense out of the contro-
versy raging around real estate syndications and will attempt to deter-
mine what, if anything, should be done to regulate them. First, the
mechanism of the real estate syndication and the specific problems
it poses for the investor will be briefly examined. Second, the ex-
isting legal framework including restrictions imposed on real estate
syndications by common law partnership and state and federal securi-
ties laws will be examined to determine whether the investor is ade-
quately protected. Third, various proposed regulatory schemes will
be examined, including the SEC's proposals for new disclosure rules,
the Washington Rules and Midwest Commissioner's Guidelines on real
estate limited partnerships. A final section examines the need for fed-
eral substantive regulations of real estate syndication. This comment
concludes that the regulators at federal and state levels have failed to
recognize the basic differences between the two major types of real es-
tate syndications----"specific property" versus "blind pool" or un-
specified, multiple property syndicates. It is suggested that specific prop-
erty syndicates can be satisfactorily regulated by disclosure only, as the
SEC proposes; blind pool syndicates, on the other hand, appear to require
substantive regulation.1 2 Failure to structure regulation to fit these two
different types of real estate syndicates will potentially distort the syn-
dication process by further limiting the attractiveness and utility of
the specific property syndication.
I. BACKGROUND TO REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS:
INVESTOR PROBLEMS
Real estate syndication is a highly complex undertaking: it is diffi-
cult for the promoter to profitably execute a syndication from begin-
11. Oct. 12, 1972, SEC REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT [July-Dec. 1972
Transfer Binder] BNA SEC. REG. & L. REPORT No. 173 at A-1.
12. No readily accepted definition of regulation by "disclosure" or "objective"
regulation is available. For the purposes of this comment, regulation by disclosure
means that there is no limit on what can be done by a syndicator (within existing legal
standards and statutory frameworks, of course) so long as it is fully disclosed before-
hand. Substantive regulation places flat prohibitions on certain otherwise legal conduct
(limits on syndicator compensation or minimum investment capital requirements)
which, of necessity, can interfere with any phase of a real estate syndication. Regulation
by disclosure presumes an intelligent investor because mere description is deemed
adequate protection; substantive regulation assumes a naive investor and relies on
subjective proscriptions of conduct for investor protection.
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ning to end; 13 it is equally difficult, if not more so, for the investor to
evaluate the soundness of a given syndication investment. This com-
ment does not attempt to provide a definitive analysis of all facets of
the syndication process;14 rather, only a few general comments on
syndications and real estate investment will be offered before focusing
on the specific problems the investor faces when contemplating the
purchase of a syndication interest.
The initial problem in understanding real estate syndications is
definitional-what is a real estate syndication and how can both the
syndicator and investor reap such tremendous benefits? Syndication
implies nothing more than a group of people associating to carry out
an enterprise. A syndication can take the legal form of a general part-
nership, a corporation or a trust, 15 but is predominantly organized as
a limited partnership. The combination of a real estate investment and
the legal entity of the limited partnership offers the investor many
benefits which can include-depending on the specific type of
investment-cash flow, tax shelter and ultimately capital apprecia-
tion.B Cash flow results from the excess of rental income over expenses
(including debt repayments and interest). Tax shelter may be achieved by
deductions for depreciation, interest and losses; present tax policy al-
lows some deductions for accelerated depreciation and interest in the
early years of the investment.' 7 Capital appreciation may result from
the ultimate sale of the syndicate's real property.
13. For an analysis of the syndication process and a list of the syndicator's tasks. %ee
S. ROULAC, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION DIGEST 1972-PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS
10-17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ROULAC].
14. For definitive analyses of the real estate syndicate, see generally ROULAC. supra
note 13; Berger, supra note 3, Miller, Real Estate Syndication Under the California
Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 371 (1969) and Hrusoff &
Cazares. Formation of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1970).
15. Miller, supra note 14.
16. M. SELDIN & R. SWESNIK, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT STRATEGY 19-40 (1970).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167, 1250, Note the advantages of accelerated
depreciation are limited to certain specific types of structures: new commercial structures
and new and used rental housing. In addition, section 167 of the Code permits com-
plete depreciation in the case of expenditures to renovate low income housing held for
a minimum of five years. Finally, the use of an accelerated depreciation method brings
the recapture provisions of section 1250 into play. As a result, accelerated depreciation
is advantageous to the limited partner only where he foresees a sharp reduction of his
income within the early years of the depreciation period, where the limited partner
dies and his estate receives a corresponding stepped up basis, reducing to zero the
amount of recapture income and where the limited partner retains the depreciable
property beyond the basic holding period required by sections 1250(a)(I)(C) and
1250(a)(2)(B).
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The legal entity of the limited partnership allows the investor to
realize these cash flow, tax shelter and capital appreciation benefits
because of the conduit nature of partnership tax treatment.18 At the
same time the investor enjoys limited liability similar to that of a cor-
porate shareholder. The limited partnership entity also allows the syn-
dicator or general partner to sell his entrepreneurial and management
skills to passive investors. Unless a corporate general partner is cre-
ated, "' the syndicator becomes personally responsible as general partner
for the liabilities of the limited partnership;20 as compensation for the
risk, the syndicator typically is well paid and has absolute control over
the business activities of the syndicate.
Traditionally, real estate syndications have been formed to develop
one specific piece of property. Development of a "specific property"
syndication poses numerous problems, which stem primarily from the
short period of time in which the syndicator must establish the syndica-
tion and the high organizational costs. During the time period in which
investor capital is raised and the necessary securities registration is
obtained, the syndicator will seek to control the property by obtaining
an option to purchase. Because of the uncertainties involved, including
the possible failure to raise sufficient funds, the seller will insist upon a
high option price.2 The syndicator must also underwrite the expenses of
locating and researching the property, securing financing for the project
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 701-08.
19. Most states now permit a corporation to be a general partner in a limited part-
nership, see, e.g., Kitchell Corp. v. Hermansen, 8 Ariz. App. 424, 466 P.2d 934 (1968)
ana J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARlFNERSHIP 147 (1968). The Internal Revefie
Service, however, has placed some restrictions on liability avoidance by using the device
of a corporate general partner. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 735. To acquire a
revenue ruling, ownership and net worth tests must be met by the corporate general
partner. Under the ownership test, the limited partners must not own, directly or indi-
rectly, more than 20% of the stock of the corporate general partner or of any affiliate
(as defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1504(a)). The net worth test requires: (1) if the
total capital contributions are less than $2,500,000, the net worth of the corporate gen-
eral partner must at all times be at least 15% of the total contributions or $250,000,
whichever is lesser and (2) where the total capital contributions are in excess of $2,-
500,000, the net worth of the corporate general partner must be at least 10% of the total
contribution. The net worth test must be met by using separate assets for a limited part-
nership in which the corporation is the sole general partner, and the net worth test must
be met at all times during the life of the limited partnership.
20. UNIFORMLIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1,6UNIFORMLAws ANNOTATED 561(1969)
[hereinafter cited as ULPA]. The ULPA is codified in Washington in WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 25.08.010-.3 10 (Supp. 1972).
21. ROULAC, supra note 13, at 10.
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and preparing a prospectus to satisfy the registration requirements of
both state and federal regulatory bodies. All of these tasks and others
must be performed in the normally short period of the option.
A recent development in real estate syndication is the unspecified
asset or "blind pool" syndication. Developed to alleviate the timing
problems of specific property syndications and to eliminate recurring
organizational and marketing functions and expenses, the blind pool
syndication achieves savings by first raising investor money and then
investing that money pursuant to a stated investment policy.2 2 As a
result, a blind pool syndication superficially resembles a mutual fund
investing in real estate. Because a blind pool syndication relies more
heavily on the blind faith of the investor than does the specific prop-
erty syndication, 23 states have been reluctant to accept blind pool real
estate syndication. Although New York has not allowed blind pool
syndication since 1961,24 most states now accept it. Indeed, the popu-
larity of blind pool syndications has grown to the point where they are
now a predominant factor in public real estate syndications.2 5 Although
the specific property and blind pool syndication perform essentially the
same functions, the differences between the two should be remem-
bered when analyzing the various problems which confront the syndi-
cation investor.
The combination of the complexities inherent in real estate invest-
ment and management and the limited partnership form of organiza-
tional entity create serious problems for the investor. Under any cir-
cumstances, a successful real estate investment depends upon the cor-
rect combination of an intricate set of variables. The most important
variable is usually the quality of the management. Unfortunately, the
limited partnership entity divorces ownership from control: the
investor does not have a direct voice in management and normally
does not know what is being done with his money or whether he is
being fairly treated. These and others problems facing the investor are
examined in detail below.
22. Id.
23. See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
24. A specific provision in the New York securities laws gives the State of New
York Attorney General the discretion to disapprove blind pool syndications. N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAw 352 (McKinney 1968).
25. Roulac, What's Inside Those Shiney New Syndication Packages?, 2 REAL
ESTATE REV. 74. 74-78 (1972).
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A. Evaluating the Underlying Real Estate Investment
A potential investor faces an almost insurmountable task in evalu-
ating the quality of the underlying real estate. Yet, such an evaluation
must be attempted because it is the specific piece of realty and the ex-
isting or envisioned improvements that most accurately reflect the
value of the syndication investment. Accurate evaluation of the under-
lying economics of the investment is increasingly important where real
estate prices have been driven up by increased demand. With any
given real estate investment, overpricing of the property, inadequate
market support for the project or fallacious assumptions behind pro-
jections can spell disaster and the loss of equity investment 2 6
The typical prospectus of a specific property real estate syndication
is not of much help to the investor. Numerous generalizations and
encouraging signs are intertwined with often confusing real estate
terminology. 27 Seldom does a prospectus present the objective facts
necessary to make a good investment decision; factors of risk con-
cerning the value of the property are likewise normally missing. Even
the opinion of an "independent appraiser" is meaningless without a
complete statement of the factors upon which the appraisal is based.28
Generally, the individual investor in a real estate syndicate is pre-
sented with far less information than is an institutional lender;29 yet if
26. See note 7 supra.
27. See, e.g., Prospectus of Grouse Mountain at Vail, Ltd., Description of Property
Section at 15, 1 ROULAC, NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS 333-47 (1972).
28. People unfamiliar with real estate appraisal often make the fallacious assump-
tion that the determination of value by an appraiser is precise and accurate and is deter-
mined by "scientific" methods. This is simply not so. S. KAHN, F. CASE & A. SCHIMMEL,
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL AND INVESTMENT 12 (1963) describes the appraisal process
as follows:
An appraisal assignment does not permit the weighing of many known factors and
the arrival at a precise and accurate statement; rather, it involves an estimation of
the influence on value of economic, sociological, political, and geographic factors.
These are social sciences and, therefore, cannot be precise, because'not enough is
known about persons and groups of persons, who are the central concern of the so-
cial sciences.
29. It is interesting to compare the information required by an institutional lender
considering a mortgage loan to a syndicate with the information available to the indi-
vidual investor in a prospectus. The syndicator's burden of convincing the lender to
loan money is much greater than the burden of disclosure imposed by securities regula-
tions which 'normally seek to inform the investor of the value of the investment. The
syndicator must absolutely convince the lender of the viability of his project. See W.
STOEBUCK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRIVATE LAND DEVELOPMENT VII- 1 (1972). Indepen-
dent appraisals funded by the syndicator, economic feasibility studies, traffic and mar-
keting surveys, analysis of present and potential competition and other expert opinions
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the investor is to make a reasonably prudent investment, he must
somehow get information similar to that which the institutional lender
demands.30
The problems which the investor faces in evaluating the underlying
real estate investment are exacerbated when an unspecified property
or blind pool syndication is involved. Typically, the property or prop-
erties are not even identified until after the investor money has been
raised. 31 Obviously much more trust must be placed in the individual
syndicator or general partner in a blind pool syndication. Trust, how-
ever, is no substitute for an adequate definition of the syndication's
investment policy and does not assure the investor of a reasonably safe
and profitable investment.
B. Financial Analysis of the Total Investment
Beyond an evaluation of real estate underlying the syndication, the
investor would ideally like to understand what the total real estate
syndication investment will mean financially. Yet where there is no
past business history for the syndication, as is generally the case, and
must be tendered by the syndicator in support of the project. Id. If a commercial enter-
prise or shopping center is the subject of the syndication, the syndicator may also have to
present signed leases of primary tenants whose base rentals will normally have to be
sufficient to service the debt. Id. In short, no loan will be made until the lender, after
exhaustive investigation, is assured that the syndicate project will be successful. More-
over, institutional investors often insist on being an active general partner in all ven-
tures. See Roege, Talbot & Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments and the Institu-
tional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579. 586-87
(1971).
30. See Hayes & Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Estate Equities, 50 HARV. Bus.REv.
86, 92-93 (1972). which examines the analysis of the real estate transaction made by the
various parties to the transaction. The authors observe that most investors are unsophis-
ticated in real estate and tend to accept the word of a well known developer, lender or
packager that the venture is commercially and financially sound. The developer, who
logically might be assumed to make a detailed analysis, often relies on the loan approval
of the first mortgage lender and the packager for indications of what the syndicate is
worth. The lender does make a detailed analysis, but this cannot be relied on by the
investor. See text accompanying note 26 supra. The lender is only concerned with his
own risk exposure, his break even point being substantially below that of the investor.
Nor does the packager do an adequate job of analysis.
3 1. See note 24 supra. The National Association of Securities Dealers' proposed
TAX SHELTER PROGRAMS regulations (see note 10 supra) expressed reluctance to even
permit its members to market blind pool programs "since they are marketed to the
public without any then contemplated use of the proceeds." The NASD was opposed to
giving the syndicator complete discretion in investing the syndication's funds, but seems
to have accepted the blind pool syndicate.
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projections are forbidden or discouraged, the investor is left to his
own devices to determine from a myriad of statements concerning the
risk present in the investment just what his return and tax shelter ben-
efits might be.32 This problem is, of course, very similar to the prob-
lems faced in evaluating the underlying real estate.
C. Tax Shelter Considerations and Loss of Investor Perspective
The appeal to the high-bracket taxpayer of the well documented
benefits of tax shelter in real estate limited partnerships 33 has the un-
fortunate effect of making it easier to obscure the basic economics of
the investment34 and to justify unreasonably high prices. Tax benefits
cannot turn unproductive property into a good investment, even
32. RouLAc, supra note 13, at 140, discusses the general problem which confronts the
potential investor as follows:
Because there is no institutional research base as exists for many investment alter-
natives, the analysis of real estate syndication investments is a'subject of extreme
importance. Limited investor knowledge and limited general information on the
field present certain challenges in the investment decision-making process. Many of
those active in the field do not understand the economic viability, tax aspects, and
legal implications of the syndications in which they are involved. Despite the
uniqueness of the concept and the complexity of the investment, there is very little
analysis of the investment merits of real estate syndications on the part of those
who offer such investments to the public and by those who ultimately invest in the
syndications.
33. When taxed as a partnership, the tax shelter benefits of real estate investment
to the individual limited partner include the deduction of interest, depreciation and
losses of the limited partnership. Deductions can generally be allocated directly to the
limited partners. But see Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395 (1970).
Generally, a real estate limited partnership can avoid corporate taxation by not
having a majority of corporate characteristics under 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)
(1)(1973). With a limited partnership the crucial corporate characteristics are:
(I) continuity of life, (2) centralization of management, (3) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property and (4) free transferability of interests. See generally
Morrissey et at. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) and B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,"
THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11-4-8 (1972).
One major appeal of a real estate syndication investment is that if it qualifies for part-
nership tax treatment, it can be a so-called "soft dollar" investment. This-means that for
each dollar invested there is a dollar tax deduction in the year of-investment or shortly
thereafter. These initial deductions are obtained by utilizing construction losses, accel-
erated depreciation and prepaid interest. For an analysis of the tax issues involved in
real estate limited partnerships, see RouLAc, supra note 13, at 110-39 and Shapiro, Tax
Planning for Equity Financing by Real Estate Developers, 50 TAXES 530 (1972).
34. See Hayes & Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Estate Equities, 50 HARV. Bus.
REV. 86 (1972). Bruckner, Marketing Syndications, in REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 343,
350-51 (D. Augustine-& R. Lowell ed. 1972) alludes to the "soft dollar" prepaid interest
problem and the general issue of tax factors disiorting all other conside'rations by
saying:
A widespread feature in California is the area I call 'prepaid interest trap." CPA's
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though good tax planning can enhance return from sound property.3 5
The problem for the investor is to keep tax shelter in its proper
perspective.
The distortion caused by overemphasis on tax factors can be perva-
sive. Where the typical corporate businessman would strive for min-
imum costs and expenses to maximize profits, a real estate syndicator
is not so motivated. High interest rates, high purchase prices, high
construction costs and high operating expenses can lure investors
seeking a tax shelter. Even if the syndicator does not actively seek
these adverse economic factors in order to create "soft dollar" invest-
ments and high profits for himself, he at least is willing to accept
them. The problem of tax distortion becomes more acute when prop-
erty prices are driven up by demand, because the margin of profit
becomes narrower and narrower. Syndications which could once offer
attractive "soft dollar" investments and provide high profits for both
the syndicator and investor while still generating enough positive cash
flow to service debts and escape insolvency can no longer achieve this
utopia quite so readily. An investment which initially offers maximum
tax shelter benefits may eventually result only in a long term capital
loss.
D. Lack of Transferability and Liquidity
For a number of reasons, limited partnership interests are usually
not transferable. Qualification for limited partnership tax treatment
requires that the limited partnership interest not be freely transferable, 313
and attorneys have many physicians and dentists as clients. This particular group of
people are attracted to this area. In November or December, if you tell a physician
or a dentist he can save income taxes, he doesn't care whether the investment is in
cigars from Cuba or chandeliers or oil or gas. It makes no difference. He doesn't
even ask whether the transactions make economic sense. He wants to save some
income tax. It is unbelievable. I have seen incredible transactions on what we call
the "prepaid interest trap." It is obviously insane financially to go into a transac-
tion for a good tax shelter if it doesn't have economic substance. You can do it
easily in land, and that's where most of the money has been lost in California. Lots
of people thought they had put one over on the government by paying $4,000 or
$5,000 an acre for land that was worth $700 or $800. They saved income tax. but
suddenly found the investment lost.
35. See note 33 supra.
36. Id. Some state partnership statutes have tried to alleviate this problem by specif-
ically making limited partnership interests assignable, see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
25.08.190 (Supp. 1972), but this does not solve the taxation issue.
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hence most limited partnership certificates include restrictions on
alienation.37 Additionally, a new purchaser normally cannot become a
substituted limited partner without the general partner's consent and
the filing of an amended partnership certificate.3 8 In some states, not-
ably California, the new investor must meet suitability standards and
the transfer must have the prior consent of the commissioner. 39
The unfortunate consequence of these restraints on transferability is
a lack of liquidity and a total absence of secondary markets for inter-
ests in real estate limited partnerships. This lack of liquidity presents
obvious problems for the investor. A long term investment in a real
estate syndicate is one thing; a complete lack of transferability re-
quiring retention of the investment until termination or insolvency is
quite another.
E. Lack of Investor Control
By definition, the limited partnership form of organization leaves
the investor (limited partner) with little control over the general
partner. Typically the limited partner has the power to examine the
books and to compel dissolution and an accounting;40 if greater con-
trol is exercised, the limited partner may be exposed to unlimited lia-
bility.41 Moreover, the common syndicator practice of contracting
with an affiliate to manage the property can further remove the inves-
37. Berger, supra note 3, at 739-40, lists the typical restraints on transfer as: (1) "the
transfer must be to a member of a recognized class;" (2) "the transferee must be ap-
proved by the syndicate manager;" (3) "the non-selling interests reserve the right of first
refusal."
38. Augustine, The Public Real Estate Limited Partnership-An Introduction, D.
AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 1, 13 (1972).
39. Efforts have been made to alleviate the liquidity problem. Some syndicates have
redemption provisions to allow investors to liquidate their limited partnership interests,
but these provisions are normally conditioned by some formula to prevent liquidation
of the syndicate's investments. Another effort to increase liquidity-is the utilization of a
two-layered equity arrangement whereby the original limited partnership sells the entire
limited partnership interest to a single individual who in turn issues units of participa-
tion in his holding to the public. Id. at 13. Although this is an ingenious attempt to cir-
cumvent tax motivated restraints on alienability, the individual takes the position of an
underwriter and thereby assumes greater risk. Id. at 14. Continued partnership tax
treatment for the holders of the participation units will also be in doubt. ROULAC, supra
note 13, at 91. These and other ingenious efforts have not produced the degree of
liquidity necessary to create secondary markets in real estate limited partnership interests.
40. ULPA § 10; WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.00 (1963).
41. ULPA § 7; WASH. REv. CODE § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1972).
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tor from management control. While some investors purposefully seek
a "passive" investment, few investors seek the total lack of control over
major decisions which accompanies investment in a limited partner-
ship. The practical effect of this lack of investor control is to give the
syndicator exclusive power to make all major investment decisions.42
Short of seeking dissolution or damages, the limited partner is power-
less.
F. Syndicator Compensation
The complex nature of the syndication process provides endless
opportunities for an unscrupulous syndicator to garner exhorbitant
profits. Of course, to maintain a proper perspective in considering
syndicator compensation, it must be remembered that in undertaking
a syndication the typical syndicator will perform an enormous amount
of work involving significant expenditures and substantial personal
risk. Syndicators quite rightly feel they should be highly compensated. 43
Unfortunately, some syndicators go beyond reasonable compensa-
tion and charge all that the market will bear. Where the syndicator
does extract excessive fees, investors' profits are diluted and the via-
bility of the entire enterprise is threatened. 44
There are three basic types of syndicator compensation. They in-
clude: (1) the "front end load" derived from fees, commissions and
promotional interests taken during the organization of the syndica-
42. Berger, supra note 3, at 742 lists major policy decisions over which the limited
partner has no say:
These decisions include the making of management or rental arrangements, bor-
rowing, refinancing, the amount and timing of distributions, the appointment of
accountants and of counsel, selection of the controlling group, refraining the organ-
izational mode and the acquisition or sale of property.
43. See RoULAC, supra note 13, at 10-17. The author distinguishes the fee justifica-
tions for a corporation, Wall Street underwriter, and a syndicate promoter. The author
sees the following factors as justifying higher fees for syndicate packagers:
1. Real estate syndicates are smaller in size relative to mutual funds and corpora-
tions. The proportionate registration and organization costs are therefore greater.
2. Syndicates have relatively much higher costs in identifying, evaluating and se-
lecting investments.
3. Many properties must be evaluated to find the "right" one.
4. Since there is less information available for the investor, the packager must edu-
cate the investor as well as sell interests.
44. The investors return is dependent on the cash flow of the syndicate. Where the
syndicator imposes numerous expenses, whether or not entirely justified, more money
goes to the syndicator and the cash flow is correspondingly diminished. High expenses
thus have the effect of raising the syndicate's break-even point.
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tion; (2) on-going compensation in the form of management fees and
indirect benefits and (3) profits derived from promotional interests on
sale or refinancing of the property.45
The front end load, which usually represents the major portion of
the syndicator's compensation, is the most controversial form of com-
pensation because it can consume a substantial proportion of the total
investor contribution to the syndicate. 46 The front end load can take
numerous forms and variations. Typically, a syndicator arranges the
sale of property to a syndicate and thus collects a real estate bro-
kerage fee, or perhaps property previously owned by the syndicator is
sold to the syndicate at a profit.47 An affiliate of the syndicator may
serve as the underwriter for the offering and be paid a high under-
writing commission. The syndicator may seek direct reimbursement
for expenses in lieu of other fees and commissions or in addition to
them.48 These various charges can represent a large portion of the
proceeds raised from investors and can place the syndicate in an early
liquidity squeeze, substantially increasing the risk of the investment.49
Although heavy front end charges may be unavoidable, their magni-
tude and relative impact on risk and investor return can at least be
disclosed to potential investors.
A more serious problem arises for the investor when the syndicator
is also allotted a promotional interest. 50 The promotional interest may
take the form of a straight equity interest in the partnership or a con-
tractually reserved right to a certain percentage of cash distributions
and liquidation value. The economic impact of the promotional in-
terest is difficult to discern because there are several ways of formu-
45. RouLAc, supra note 13, at 26; Hrusoff& Cazares, Formation of the Public Lim-
ited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS LJ. 86, 113 (1970).
46. The front end load is controversial for two reasons. First, it can have a substan-
tial effect on the liquidity of a syndication when liquidity is needed the most. With a
$1,000,000 property investment in which $200,000 is equity and $800,000 is financed, a
syndicator often is paid up to a 10% brokers commission on the sale price, which is
$ 100,000. This means 50% of the investor's contribution can go immediately to the
syndicator. Second, the front end commission is arguably not justified until the syndica-
tion is a long run success. See Hayes & Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Estate Equities,
HARv. Bus. REV. 86, 94 (1972).
47. Augustine, The Public Real Estate Limited Partnership-An Introduction,
in REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 1, 15-16 (D. Augustine & R. Lowell ed. 1972).
48. RouLAc, supra note 13, at 26.
49. See note 46 supra.
50. RouL~c, supra note 13, at 30.
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lating the interest; 51 subtle changes in wording can have dramatic ef-
fects on the relative participation positions of the investors and the
syndicator.5 2 Thus, in analyzing the front end load the investor often
has a very difficult time appreciating just how much the syndicator
will profit from the syndication.
Management fees and indirect benefits serve as compensation for
the syndicator's ongoing efforts during the term of the syndication.
Again the combination of direct management fees and indirect bene-
fits makes it difficult to determine how much is being raked off the top
by the syndicator. The management fee typically ranges from three to
six percent of gross rent revenue.53 Indirect benefits can include
charges for managing syndicate affairs, as distinguished from man-
aging syndicate property. 54 Affiliates of the syndicator also typically
provide numerous management services whose charges are treated as
expenses over and above the basic management fee. Other indirect
benefits include insurance fees, fees for acting as the general con-
tractor and fees for acting as the holder of secondary financing in the
form of a wrap-around mortgage.5 5
Finally, the syndication may provide for "incentive compensation"
to management which typically takes the form of a promotional in-
terest in gains realized on sale or refinancing. 56 This nebulous provi-
sion further clouds the issue of determining exactly how much the
promoter is being compensated.
G. Conflicts of Interest and Self Dealing
A real estate limited partnership is fertile ground for conflicts of
interest and self dealing. Only a few will be mentioned. All the indi-
rect services which may be furnished to the partnership by the syndi-
cator's affiliates present serious self dealing problems.5 7 When the
51. Id.
52. Id. at 35-49. The promotional interest will be determined by the definition of
terms such as "return," "'investment" and "proceeds from sale." If the general partner's
promotional interest is subordinated until the limited partners receive certain returns, it
is often important whether the promotional interest is cumulative, what priority it has
and whether its calculations are based on net or gross income.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. at 31.
56. Id. at 30.
57. See Trans-West Companies' brochure which describes three affiliated companies
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syndicator is compensated by a real estate brokerage commission he is
motivated to pay a high price in order to maximize his commission,
which runs contrary to the syndicator's duty to the partnership. Other
potential conflicts include selling property to the partnership at a
profit, leasing property from the syndicate at low rates and transacting
business between various syndicator owned partnerships.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the problems facing an
investor who either attempts to evaluate a real estate syndication's
potential or who has already invested in a syndicate are numerous.
These problems are not of recent origin, and an investor in a real es-
tate syndication can look to several bodies of law for protection.
Whether the existing syndicate investor protections are adequate in
view of the increased complexity and popularity of real estate syndi-
cation is open to question.
II. EXISTING SYNDICATE INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
Investors in real estate limited partnership interests can look to
three basic bodies of law for protection against the many potential
abuses of the real estate syndication-the common law (including the
law of limited partnerships as codified by the uniform partnership
acts) 58 federal securities laws and finally state securities laws. Each
provides potentially important protections for the investor.
A. Common Law
The common law and the common law of limited partnerships as
codified by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) and the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)59 form the basis of the relationship
which perform property management and marketing, land research and acquisition and
underwriting, respectively. See also Rosenblatt, supra note 3, which describes a typical
affiliate problem like this: "One of several subsidiary firms would run the property:
there was a hotel management firm, a bar management firm, and even a company to run
a food service at two student residence halls." See note 7 supra for the context of the
author's comments.
58. The limited partner and the relation between the limited partner and the general
partner is governed by the ULPA. See note 20 supra. As of 1972, the ULPA had been
adopted in some form by 48 states. 6 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 559, as amended,
(Supp. 1972). See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 25.08 (1963).




between the syndicator and the investor in a limited partnership syndi-
cation by defining the duties and responsibilities of each. Unfortu-
nately, there is a dearth of case law dealing specifically with the lim-
ited partnership entity. Thus, while some aspects of the relationship
between the general and limited partners are clear from the governing
statutes,60 other aspects of the relationship must be determined by ref-
erence to analogous relationships in general partnership, corporation,
trust and creditor-debtor law. 61 These bodies of law make it possible
to characterize the relationships and corresponding duties of the par-
ties to a real estate syndication with some precision despite the paucity
of specific case law.
Many of the problems surrounding investment in real estate syndi-
cations arise in the solicitation stage of the syndication. The investor
often can be misled by a promoter's sales talk, a circular or a pros-
pectus which contains misrepresentations or material nondisclosures.
Most investors who have been duped at this stage of the process will
turn to the state and/or federal securities law remedies which will be
discussed later.6 2 Although generally viewed as less effective than se-
curities law remedies, 63 the common law remedies can be utilized in
some jurisdictions more effectively than corresponding securities law
remedies.6 4
Common law remedies can be especially effective in situations
where the relationship between the parties to a transaction justifies the
imposition of special duties. Such a relationship exists in the context
of the real estate syndication. The syndicator is under a duty to the
investor to exercise reasonable care to disclose pertinent information
concerning the investment. This duty arises from two separate
sources: (1) the business relation between the syndicator and the
60. The ULPA governs most aspects of limited partnership relations. ULPA § 9(I)
incorporates UPA provisions concerning the general partner.
61. Recently courts have been willing to look to these analogous bodies of law for
answers to limited partnership issues. See, e.g. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch..
344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965). The court in holding that limited partners have the right to
sue derivatively analogized the limited partner to a creditor, trust beneficiary and share-
holder. The case is noted in Comment, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue Deriva-
tively, 65 COLUNM. L. REV. 1463 (1965).
62. See text accompanying notes 93-148 infra. The securities law remedies serve as
a codification and in some cases an extension of the common law remedies of rescission
and deceit. See Shulman, Civil Liberty and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227. 228-29
(1933) [hereinafter cited as Shulman].
63. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1430-44, 1624-31 (2d ed. 1961).
64. See generally W. PROSSER, LAWOFTORTS §§ 106-11 (4thed. 1971).
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investor 65 and (2) the fiduciary duties owed by a genexal partner to a
prospective limited partner upon the formation of the partnership.66
Where this duty exists, courts are willing to impose liability without
rigid adherence to the traditional elements of deceit,67 thereby
avoiding some of the more troublesome elements of proof. 68
Where the business relationship forms the basis for the action, the
action will sound in tort and damages will be *owed by the syndicator
to the investor for misrepresentation or nondisclosure. These damages
will normally be measured by the difference between the actual value
of the limited partnership interest received and the value of the interest
65. Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wn. 2d 621, 393 P.2d 287 (1964), which
quoted the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1938) in applying the rule that a
. . party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to dis-
close to the other before the transaction is consummated ... such matters as the other
is entitled to know because of... a relation of trust and confidence between them," to a
mortgage banker who successfully solicited an investment without stating all the mate-
rial facts. The court held the mortgage banker liable and equated nondisclosure of a
material fact with a false representation. See also Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70
Wn. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891 (1967).
66. The ULPA § 9 incorporates UPA § 21(1) which imposes fiduciary duties on the
general partner. See note 83 and accompanying text infra. Unfortunately, it is not clear
when this fiduciary duty of the general partner to the limited partner begins. See R.
ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP 523 (2d ed. 1960). Upon analyzing the relationship of a general
partner who is privy to all information and a prospective limited partner who is not, it
seems clear that the fiduciary duties should be established early. Moreover, there is an
apt analogy to corporations law which imposes fiduciary duties on the promoter. See W.
CARY, CORPORATIONS 1042 (4th ed. 1969); Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting
Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909). The court in Klebanow v. New
York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), was willing to freely analogize to
corporate relationships. See note 61 supra.
67. See, e.g., Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 920, 425 P.2d 891,
895 (1967) which lists nine elements for establishing fraud:
(I) A representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its falsity; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it
should be acted upon by the person to whom it is made; (6) ignorance of its falsity
on the part of the person to whom it is made; (7) the latter's reliance on the truth of
the representation; (8) his right to rely on it; (9) his consequent damage.
The Washington court uses the term fraud instead of deceit, but the elements of proof
are identical.
68. Thus, nondisclosure has been held to be the equivalent of an affirmative false
representation of fact. Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 915, 425 P.2d 891
(1967); Boonstra v. Stephens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wn. 2d 621, 393 P.2d 287 (1964). Several
jurisdictions are apparently willing to accept innocent misrepresentation of fact as a
basis for liability where the misrepresentation was made to induce a business transac-
tion and there was detrimental reliance by the buyer. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §
107 at 711 (4th ed. 1971). See also Pratt v. Thompson, 133 Wash. 218, 233 P. 637
(1925). But see Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 53 Wn. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1958),




as represented.' :' Where the partnership fiduciary relation forms the
basis for the action, the general partner is accountable to the partner-
ship for any benefit or profits achieved.7 1'
Once the limited partnership is formed, the duties and responsibil-
ities of parties become subject to the provisions of the ULPA and the
terms of the partnership agreement. The ULPA defines the relation-
ship between the various parties and establishes certain basic rights
and privileges which cannot be compromised in the partnership agree-
ment. While this offers the typical investor numerous benefits and
many significant protections, the ULPA also places severe restrictions
on the limited partner. It is therefore necessary to examine how the
ULPA affects the relationship between the investor and syndicator.
One major attraction of the limited partnership organization entity
is that the limited partner, like a corporate shareholder, will not be
held personally liable to the creditors of the partnership.7 1 This aspect
of the real estate syndication is of critical importance and in order to
retain this insulation from liability, the typical investor will religiously
seek adherence to the provisions of the ULPA which condition this
limited liability. Unfortunately, to adhere to these conditions, the
investor must give up the ability to retain control over his investment.
This relinquishment of control contrasts with the corporate context
where the corporate shareholder potentially has much greater con-
trol through the exercise of his voting power.
The critical condition to limited liability is the ULPA's proscription
against limited partners taking part "in the control of the business." 72
Unfortunately, neither "the Act nor the decisions under it are very
helpful on the critical question of how much review, advisory manage-
ment selection, or veto power a limited partner may have without
being regarded as taking part in control. ' 73 The prudent limited
partner will restrict his conduct to avoid any possible imposition of
69. Chisum, State Regulation of Franchising: The Washington Experience, 48 WASH.
L. REV. 291, 302 (1973). Some jurisdictions will use an "out of pocket" measure of dam-
ages. Id.
70. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 389-97 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as CRANE & BROMBERG].
71. U LPA § 1; Lears, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715.
724 (1917). See WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1972).
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1972).
73. CRANE & BROMBERG. supra note 70, at 147.
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liability; the syndicator will welcome this insulation from investor
control and scrutiny.
Some jurisdictions have extended the limited partners' ability to
take actions which do not constitute "control" by permitting limited
partners to vote on the election or removal of general partners, termi-
nation of the partnership, amendments to the partnership agreement
and sale of all or substantially all of the partnership's assets. 74 But
these provisions are permissive only; if they are not included in the
partnership agreement, they cannot be of help to the limited partner.
Absent these special powers, the limited partner can only inspect the
partnership books and judicially force a dissolution and accounting.7 5
In sum, the limited partner's position is clearly tenuous: his capital
contribution is subordinate to creditors' claims on dissolution or insol-
vency76 and he normally has no ability to control management.77
Since the limited partner is precluded from active participation in
the business of the partnership, he must rely on the general partner to
operate within prescribed fiduciary patterns.78 Although the ULPA
does not specifically mention fiduciary duties, section 9(1) of the
ULPA incorporates all of the UPA provisions concerning the general
partner, including the imposition of fiduciary duties. Included is the
duty to:7 9
. . . account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for
it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liqui-
dation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
74. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 15507 (West 1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070
(Supp. 1972).
75. ULPA § 10(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.100(1963).
76. ULPA § 23; WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.230 (1963). The general partner's claims,
however, are subordinate to the limited partner.
77. See note 75 supra.
78. One classic characterization of the fiduciary duties of the general partner is
found in Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893). It is:
well settled that one partner cannot, directly or indirectly, use partnership assets
for his own benefit; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partnership, take
any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot carry on the business of the part-
nership for his private advantage; that he cannot carry on another business in com-
petition or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the benefit of his
time, skill, and fidelity, without being accountable to his copartners for any profit
that may accrue to him therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself
that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of which he is a member; nor
can he avail himself of knowledge or information which may be properly regarded
as the property of the partnership, in the sense that it is available or useful to the
firm for any purpose within the scope of the partnership business.
79. UPA § 21(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.04.210 (1963).
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The general partner's fiduciary duties go beyond this basic charge
to include both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.80
Because of a lack of case law, the requisite standard of care for the
general partner in a limited partnership is not clear. The general
partner in a general partnership need only satisfy a good faith/gross
negligence test.81 As long as he performs his duties to the best of his
ability and in good faith, courts seem willing to excuse negligence.82
This standard appears to be too lenient for the limited partnership
context where the limited partner is precluded from participating in
partnership business. It seems much more logical to analogize to a
corporate director-shareholder relation, where liability is imposed for
simple negligence, and to impose this same standard of care on the
general partner in a limited partnership. 83
The general partner's duty of loyalty in the limited partnership con-
text is similarly unclear. Here, however, it seems reasonable to analo-
gize to the general partnership context where a very high standard of
loyalty is imposed on the "managing partner"84 and to impose this
same standard of loyalty on a general partner who exercises complete
control over a limited partnership's affairs.8 5 Accordingly, the general
partner should be required to disclose to the limited partners all mat-
ters material to partnership affairs. Further, this high duty of loyalty
should prohibit the general partner from taking advantage of partner-
ship opportunities for personal benefit.86 Unfortunately, judicially
recognized exceptions to the partnership opportunity doctrine have
developed in the general partnership context and may be applied to
limited partnerships as well. These exceptions include good faith ac-
tion by the general partner where the partnership has insufficient
funds or where the general partner is not acting within the scope of
the partnership business.8 7
80. Note, Fidltciary Ditties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REV. 902, 906 (1963)
[ hereinafter cited as Fiduciary Duties].
81 Id.
82. Id.
83. The general partner resembles in many ways the corporate director who is liable
for ordinary negligence. See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880): Selheimer v. Man-
ganese Corp. of America, 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966).
84. For illustrations of the high standard required in a general partnership context
see Fiduciary Duties, supra note 80, at 907 and Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.458.
164 N.E. 545 (1928).
85. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 80, at 907.
86. Id. at 908.
87. /d.at910.
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Despite the uncertainty surrounding the general partner's duties of
care and loyalty, several recent cases breathe life into the protections
afforded limited partners through the fiduciary duty concept. In Lich-
tyger v. Franchard Corporation,88 the New York Court of Appeals
permitted a limited partner class action suit to obtain compensatory
and punitive damages from general partners who had breached their
fiduciary duties by negotiating new lease and'mortgage terms which
significantly reduced the limited partners' investment return. The
court held that nothing in partnership law precluded a class action
against the general partners, reasoning that a limited partner is in a
position analogous to that of a corporate shareholder.89 The court saw
no reason not to give the limited partner the rights of a corporate
shareholder in a similar situation.9 0
[TI he principle is the same-those in control of the business must
deal fairly with the interests of the other investors and this is so re-
gardless of whether the business is in corporate or partnership
form . . . . A breach of this fiduciary duty adversely affects in the
same way the interests of every investor who has no voice in the oper-
ations of the business and, being a wrong done to all, it should be sus-
ceptible of correction by legal action taken for the benefit of all. To
permit stockholders to bring a representative suit but to deny the same
privilege to limited partners would be highly unreasonable.
If courts are willing to equate a limited partner to a corporate
shareholder in other situations, limited partners will have a significant
new tool for dealing with real estate syndicators.
Limited partners have also been allowed to sue derivatively in situ-
ations where the general partner cannot or will not act for the benefit
of the limited partnership.9 1 Derivative suits by the limited partners
have not been held to be precluded by ULPA § 26, which provides that
a limited partner is not a proper party in actions by or against the
partnership. This section has been construed only to prohibit the limit-
88. 18 N.Y.2d 528,223 N.E. 2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
89. Both a corporate shareholder and a limited partner have limited liability and
neither has a significant voice in the operation of the enterprise. Lichtyger, supra note
88, 223 N.E.2d at 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
90. Id. at 873-74.
91. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965);
Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 48 Misc. 2d 282, 264 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct.
1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966).
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ed partner from interfering with the right of the general partner to
carry on the business of the partnership. If the general partner wrong-
fully refuses to carry out the business of the partnership, however,
then the limited partners can sue derivatively92
Thus, the investor in a real estate syndication has significant
common law rights vis-a-vis the syndicator or general partner. The
potential impact of these rights on common syndication abuses such
as conflict of interest, self dealing, unreasonable compensation and
disclosure is apparent. In practice, however, these common law reme-
dies have not proved to be beneficial for a number of reasons. The
legal structure of the limited partnership fosters secrecy on the part of
the general partner which results in a lack of timely information and
prevents effective utilization of these remedies. Without information,
breaches of these common law duties will not be discovered and ac-
tions will not be brought. Even when breaches are discovered, without
adequate and timely information liability may be difficult to establish
or the general partners may have become insolvent or disappeared.
Where there is little chance of recovery, the cost of litigation deters
action.
B. Federal Securities Regulation
The federal securities laws were conceived to compensate for the
shortcomings of the common law remedies by compelling complete
and accurate disclosure of all relevant information to enable the
investor to make an intelligent decision on the efficacy of an indi-
vidual investment.93 To buttress the disclosure requirements, the se-
curities laws incorporate both civil and criminal liabilities for misre-
presentation." 4 Because of their emphasis on disclosure, the federal
92. Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386. 223
N.E.2d 876. 879-80 (1966): New York has provided the right to sue derivatively. See N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
93. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, THE WHEAT REPORT. § II B I at 49 (CCH 3d
ed. Oct. 1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT] summarizes the policy of disclosure
as follows:
The fundamental aim of the prospectus requirement was to provide information.
and not to shield the public from ventures deemed to be of dubious merit. 'The
purpose of these sections,' said the House Committee. 'is to secure potential buyers
the means of understanding the intricacies of the transaction into which they are
invited.' (footnotes omitted)
94. Shulman, supra note 62, at 227.
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securities laws are best viewed as preventive regulation, whereas the
common law remedies have a primarily redressive impact.95
There is no question that limited partnership interests are securities
and thus covered by the Securities Act of 1933.96 Rather, the thresh-
old issue in the regulation of real estate syndicates is whether the
syndicate offering comes within one of the exemptions to the 1933
Act.97 It should be noted that SEC Proposed Rule 146 may signifi-
cantly expand present concepts of the nonpublic offering exemption
by allowing sales to 35 or fewer persons to be exempt.:8 If there is no
exemption, the syndicate must register its securities and conform to
the 1933 Act's stringent requirements of disclosure;99 if exempt, the
offering is left to the regulation of applicable state securities laws.
Even though the securities are initially registered with the SEC, state
95. Id.
96. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) for the definition of
security. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877, 32 Fed. Reg. 11705 (1967) demon-
strates the extremely broad coverage of the term "security" by stating.
Under the Federal Securities Laws, an offering of limited partnership interests
and interests in joint or profit sharing real estate ventures generally constitutes an
offering of a 'profit sharing agreement' or an 'investment contract' which is a 'secur-
ity' within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. The Supreme
Court has said that an 'investment contract' is a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party (SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328*U.S.
293, 298, 299 (1946)). In other words, the investor provides the capital and shares in
the risk and the profits; the promoter or third party manages, operates and controls
the enterprise, usually without active participation on the part of the investor.
See also Sire Plan Portfolio, Inc. v. Carpenter, 8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956);
Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (construing the
definition of "security" contained in Washington's security legislation (WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.005(12) (Supp. 1972)) to be identical to the definition of that term in the
Federal Securities Act of 1933).
97. There are two major exemptions from the 1933 Act: 15 U.S.C. § "77c(a)(1 1)
(1970) (instrastate exemption) and 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970) (private offering). See
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11896 (1961) on the intrastate
exemption and SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552,27 Fed. Reg. 11316(1962) on the
private exemption. See also Comment, SEC Regulation of California Real Estate Syn-
dicates, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 214-20 (1973). The newly emerging integration doctrine
(when one of a series of successive syndication offerings by the same syndicator fails to
qualify for either the private offering or the intrastate exemption, all the offerings are
integrated and exemption is denied to all), which restricts the availability of these two
exemptions is discussed in Note, Application of the Securities Doctrine of Integration
to Real Estate Syndicates, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 428 (1973).
98. SEC Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26140 (1972). See generally Note, 48
WASH. L. REV. 922, 934-38 (1973) and Comment, Reforming the Initial Sale Require-
ments of the Private Placement Exemption, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403 (1972).
99. Failure to register a real estate syndicate as required gives the purchaser the
right to rescind and recover the price paid plus interest. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1970).
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regulation can be a second hurdle for syndicate offerings. The Securi-
ties Act of 1933 provides that states have the power to impose addi-
tional regulation on securities sold within their jurisdictions. "),
1. Regulation by Disclosure: Problems with Form S-11
The disclosure required for registration constitutes the heart of pre-
sent SEC regulation of real estate syndicates. Most blind pool syndi-
cates and many large specific property syndicates want national expo-
sure for their offering and therefore have to conform to these disclo-
sure requirements. Form S-Il promulgates the primary guidelines for
the form and content of the prospectus and registration statement for
real estate related offerings. 10 1 Since the purpose of Form S-Il is to
disclose information essential to an investor's understanding of the
risks involved in a real estate investment, the efficacy of the form can
best be analyzed by examining its disclosure requirements in light of
specific investor problems which might be alleviated by full disclosure
in the prospectus.
Perhaps the most important part of the prospectus to the investor is
the introductory statement which is required to summarize the "prin-
cipal factors which make the offering speculative."'10 2 Form S-II in-
structions specifically require that the following factors be discussed
where appropriate for a clear understanding by investors: (1) a per-
centage comparison of the securities being offered to the public and
those issued to persons affiliated with the promoter; (2) potential lia-
bility of security holders for the acts or obligations of the registrant;
(3) allocation of cash distributions between investors and affiliated
persons and (4) remuneration and other benefits to be received by af-
filiated persons.' 0 3 In addition, the cover of the prospectus must speci-
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)( I1) (1970).
101. See SEC Form S-I 1, For Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933 of
Securities of Certain Real Estate Companies, I CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7231
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Form S-I 1]. Section A of the General Instructions states:
This form shall be used for registration under the Securities Act of 1933 of (i) se-
curities issued by real estate investment trust, as defined in Section 856 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, or (ii) securities issued by other issuers whose business is
primarily that of acquiring and holding for investment real estate or interests in
real estate or interests in other issuers whose business is primarily that of acquiring
and holding real estate or interest in real estate for investment.
102. FormS- 1l, supra note 101, General Instructions D(c).
103. Id.
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fically disclose both the limitations on the transferability of securities
and the absence of a secondary market.' 04 If there are high risk fac-
tors not included in the specific introductory risk statements, the "risk
factor" section of the introductory statement may be expanded to dis-
close these supplemental considerations.' 05 The SEC may also tailor
the Form S- 1i to fit a particular offering.' 06 Presumably this introduc-
tory "risk factor" section will make the investor apprehensive of a
highly speculative investment.
After reviewing the specific high risk factors, the investor theoretically
should be able to extract from the body of the prospectus enough in-
formation to undertake the first step in an inquiry into the efficacy of
a particular real estate investment-the evaluation of the underlying
real estate. Of utmost importance then, are the factors relevant to val-
uation of the project disclosed in the prospectus. Because of the risks
and assumptions inherent in any estimation of value, the determina-
tion and disclosure of the value of a proposed real estate project is
one of the most difficult aspects of disclosure mechanics.
On its face the Form S-1 1 disclosure requirements appear to re-
quire sufficient disclosure concerning the particular property involved.
However, in practice these disclosure requirements are apparently of
little help. The Form requires the registrant to give the location and to
describe the general character of major properties held or to be ac-
104. Id. at D(d).
105. See, e.g., Prospectus of Pacific Properties Ltd., ROULAC, supra note 13, at 356,
360-61 where the following factors were discussed in the introductory "risk factor" sec-
tion: (1) Use of proceeds undetermined; (2) no assurance that proceeds raised will reach
minimum; (3) no cash distributions from general partner run syndications; (4) possible
conflicts of interest;,(5) management fee of 5% of cost of syndicate properties; (6) lack
of transferability; (7) might be taxed on income even though no cash distribution; (8)
investments of syndicate leveraged; (9) no guarantee that tax treatment will not be
changed; (10) changes in general and local economic conditions and in rates of interest
may adversely affect the operations of the partnership; (11) Phase Two effects; (12) no
participation in management for limited partners; (13) general partners will not devote
full time to syndicate business.
106. Although the standard S-1 Form does not require an introductory statement,
similar statements have been required on that form for high risk offerings. For real es-
tate connected registrants, the S- II introduction may require special introductory disclo-
sures relating to the property and the promoter. Special property disclosures may re-
quire paragraphs concerning competition, lack of tenants, age or unsuitability of the
building or other factors contributing to high risk. Special promoter disclosures include
possible adverse factors such as lack of experience, prior bankruptcies or prior securi-
ties act violations. See Rifkind & Borton, SEC Registration of Real Estate Interests: An
Overview, 27 Bus. LAW 649, 663 (1972). See also SEC Form S-I, Information Required
In Prospectus, I CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 17123 (1973).
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quired by the syndicate, to describe the use or proposed use of the
properties and to evaluate the properties' suitability and adequacy for
that use."1 7 The syndicator is required to outline any proposed pro-
gram for renovation, improvement or development of the property
and to describe the general competitive conditions for the property.108
The information garnered from these requirements can be, and usually
is, general and inconclusive, if not actually misleading, concerning
the "value" of the project. 10 1 One can only conclude that the SEC in-
tends that the investor rely upon other parties in the transaction-such
as the syndicator, underwriter or primary lender-for an evaluation
of future value." 0 Perhaps the Commission believes that the typical
investor is not capable of assessing the value of a project. Yet these
basic considerations concerning the value of the real estate are the
underpinnings of the syndicate and represent a very large part of the
limited partner's risk.
The Form S-1 1 disclosure requirements for the financial aspects
of the syndication are much more thorough, perhaps even too thor-
ough. The poor organization of the financial data forces the investor
to synthesize the maze of information located in different parts of the
prospectus to determine what the economic future of the project is
and how the mortgages, front end load, promotional interests, man-
agement fees and collateral expenses will affect his risk. While the ef-
fect of each of these factors on the investor's risk is adequately dis-
closed, an evaluation of the cumulative effect of all the factors, which
is most important to the investor, is missing. However, if the security
being registered is a new issue for an existing syndicate, the Form
provides sufficient information because one section must provide past
107. Form S-l l. supra note 101, Item 10(a).
108. Id. at 10(d)&(e).
109. See, e.g., Prospectus of Pacific Properties Ltd.. ROULAC, supra note 13. at 356.
373-74. The prospectus states that the subject property was valued at $10,000,000 by an
appraisal which used a 96% occupancy factor, which is quite high. The prospectus
goes on to say that "the report [of the appraiser] did not take into account all ex-
penses which will be incurred in the operation of the property." There was no indica-
tion of what the "expenses" alluded to might be or how significant they were. The
prospectus goes on to mention several encouraging factors, such as the soon to be
completed "BART" service, but does not specifically disclose competition or other
risk factors. Compare Prospectus for Tucker Land Co., in REAL ESTATE SYNDICATiONS
406, 413-20 (D. Augustine & R. Lowell ed. 1972). which provides a thorough descrip-
tion of the general area, the property, utilities, description of adjacent properties.
zoning, plan of development and property taxes and includes topographical maps.
110. See note 30 supra.
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financial data, if any."' Unfortunately, the vast majority of registra-
tions are the initial offerings of syndicates for which detailed financial
histories are not available.
Disclosure of blind pool investment policies also is inadequate
under the Form S-1 1. Blind pool syndicators are required to indicate
the geographic areas in which real estate will be acquired, the specific
types of real estate, e.g., office buildings, apartment buildings or other,
and the proposed method of operating and financing.112 The regis-
trant must also indicate whether his policy is to invest primarily for
income or for capital gain and must state any limits on the percentage
of assets to be invested in any one property.' 13 Again, these are general
statements which are of questionable value to the investor. 14 Absent
much more detailed disclosure requirements for the blind pool's future
investment policies, perhaps the most useful information the potential
investor could receive relates to the syndicator's background and ex-
perience, especially when the blind pool has no operating history.
Unfortunately, the Form S-11 does not specifically require detailed
background information; the Form requires only the names, positions
and principal occupations for the past five years of the syndicate's
general partners and officers.
The relative value of tax shelter and its importance to the investor
are also not adequately disclosed when the S-11 requirements are fol-
lowed. The issue here is not the risk of losing favorable tax treatment,
but rather the allocation of too high a "value" to the tax shelter as-
Ill. See Form S-I I, supra note 101, Item 6, which requires a thorough summary of
financial data for the registrants' last fiscal year.
112. FormS-ll, supra note 101, Item 9.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Prospectus for Pacific American Real Estate Fund 197 IB, 2 ROULAC,
NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS 739-46 (1972), where the investment objectives state:
capital will be invested in improved real estate of the following types only: apart-
ment buildings; hotel, motels, and related facilities; shopping centers; warehouses;
mobile home parks; manufacturing plants; health and medical care buildings; and
office buildings.
(Obviously the syndicator did not want to tie his hands.) The prospectus goes on to de-
scribe several restrictive but nonexclusive conditions on investment and concludes with
the final condition that
[I]n the opinion of the General Partner's Investment Committee, the
property will generate, during the period of at least two years following the pur-
chase, cash flow after debt service of no less than 8 per cent per annum of the part-
nership's cash investment in the property.
Compare Prospectus of Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd., in I S. ROULAC, NOTA-
BLE SYNDICATIONS 145-56 (1972).
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pects of the syndication. The Form requires only a brief description of
the "material aspects of the tax treatment of the registrant" 115 and is
apparently concerned only with the investor understanding the risks of
not receiving the tax treatment that is represented. Yet the importance
of the tax shelter aspects of a syndication can only be kept in perspec-
tive if discussed in connection with the other financial aspects of the
syndication. When the tax aspects of the investment are isolated in the
prospectus, the investor may not obtain the proper tax shelter perspec-
tive and may form erroneous assumptions concerning the normally
adverse factors of negative cash flow and high expenses, which can
appear to be an "asset" from the tax shelter point of view.' 16
Registrant and affiliate "remuneration" are emphasized throughout
the Form S-11,11 7 but the overall impact of insider remuneration is
not apparent when the Form is followed. An important deficiency is
that the syndicator's promotional interest in profits and proceeds of
sales to the syndicate is not specifically disclosed along with other
more direct forms of compensation, with the result that the total com-
pensation to the syndicator and his affiliates may not be apparent. An
additional problem is that the registrant need disclose only basic prop-
erty management arrangements; the same section of the prospectus
need not disclose that sub-management services may be performed by
affiliates at substantial cost." 18
In summary, there are two basic problems with the Form S-I I
when used in connection with the registration of real estate syndica-
tions. First, the information required is so unorganized that it can
often be more confusing than helpful for the investor. Second, it ap-
pears that the Form was not devised specifically for real estate limited
115. Form S-I 1, supra note 101, Item 12.
116. Isolating the tax shelter aspects of a prospectus from the other financial factors
can be misleading to the unsophisticated investor. It is not hard to envision the investor
hungry for tax shelter reading the following paragraph in the introductory "risk factor"
section and then looking for the possibility of "soft dollars" throughout the prospectus.
Investment in the Units is only considered suitable for those whose taxable income
places them in the higher federal income tax brackets since it is expected that
each holder of a Unit will be entitled to substantial tax deductions at least in
the earlier years, and, therefore, the risks of such investment will be significantly
reduced for such persons.
Prospectus for Tucker Land Co., in REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS 406. 409 (D. Augustine
& R. Lowell ed. 1972).
117. Form S-I, supra note 101, Item 20. The risk factor section must also dis-
close sundicator equity participation. Id., Item 4.
118. Form S- 11, supra note 101, Item 22.
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-partnerships and the peculiar problems that they present to the
investor;' 19 the Form seems primarily designed for ongoing businesses
with historical data which are making a non-initial offering. Unfortu-
nately, real estate syndicates normally make only one initial offering.
Since for these syndicates the Form does not require adequate informa-
tion to replace the missing historical data, it is of little use to the
investor. The Form can and should be changed to accommodate the
peculiar problems of the real estate limited partnership and should
require that the information be organized and collated to enable the
investor to understand what various aspects of the syndication mean
to him.
Of course, a more basic problem also exists. Even if the prospectus
format is improved to provide full and accurate disclosure of all nec-
essary information for the typical investor, it is questionable how
much impact the disclosures would have. Factors such as high ex-
penses and negative cash flow with their tax shelter implications are so
divorced from these considerations involved in the corporate offering
that the federal securities law policy of regulation solely by disclosure
without substantive rules becomes suspect.
2. Remedies for Violation of Federal Securities Law
The general disclosure policy of the 1933 Act is supplemented by
restrictions on marketing practices, 20 the threat of civil and criminal
remedies, 12' and the SEC's rigorous supervision of registration state-
ments.' 22 All of these factors theoretically promote precision in the
prospectus and other promotional material used by the syndicator.
The civil liability remedies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are espe-
cially important to the syndicate investor because they provide a
prime source for legal redress against unscrupulous syndicators. These
119. The form was designed for real estate investment trusts and corporations
and is used collaterally for real estate limited partnerships. See note 101 supra.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). See also ROULAC, supra note 13, at 50-82 for a
treatment of the problems of marketing real estate syndication securities.
121. The criminal remedies have not been effective as a supplement to the disclosure
policy because the criminal penalty provisions of the 1933 Act have not been enforced
due to fiscal and manpower restraints within the SEC. HousE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COMMERCE AND FINANCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY REPORT, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REPORTS, Special Report 438 (Aug. 25, 1972).
122. The SEC's supervisory powers are backed by the use of stop orders, which can
have disastrous effects on the marketing of limited partnership interests.
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provisions broaden some aspects of common law investor remedies
and, in addition, broaden the group of persons potentially liable to the
investor.' 2 3 The 1933 Act has three specific civil liability provisions.
Section 11 subjects the issuer of registered securities and other partici-
pants in the offering to liability for damages when the registration
statement is materially misleading or deceptive.'2 4 Section 12(1) im-
poses liability for rescission or damages upon anyone who offers or
sells a security in violation of the registration or prospectus provisions
of the Act while using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. ' '-2 5
Section 12(2) imposes liability for rescission or damages upon anyone
who offers or sells a security by means of a prospectus or oral commu-
nication that contains a material omission or misstatement, whether or
not the security is registered or exempt from registration. 2 6 Although
the civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act may promote accurate
disclosure by serving as a deterrent, they have not been utilized to a
high degree by investors in the past'2 7 and will probably continue to
play a small role in the future due to the emergence of Section 10b of
the 1934 Act and Rule IOb-5.' 28
The existence of a private remedy under Rule lOb-5 seems well
established, 12: the major issue being the scope of coverage under the
Rule. When literally read, liability is established under Rule 1Ob-5 in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security when it is proved that
there exists (1) fraud, material misstatement or silence when there
was a duty to speak and (2) use of some instrumentality of interstate
commerce.' 3 Judicial interpretations of the Rule, however, have added
requirements of reliance,' 3' causation' 32 and scienter.' 3 3 Most courts
123. The Securities Act of 1933 provides that all persons who sign the registration
statement or who participate in the preparation or certify part of the registration state-
ment and all underwriters are potentially liable for misrepresentations or material omis-
sions in the registration statements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
124. Id.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
127. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1684-92 (2d ed. 1961) & 3820-26 (Supp. 2d
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
128. 15U.S.C.§ 78j(1970).
129. Loss, supra note 127, at 3869-73.
130. Id. at 1764-65.
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will accept negligent as well as intentional misstatements or material
nondisclosures as a basis for liability. 34 The implementation of Rule
1Ob-5 by the federal courts has essentially created a new source of
substantive law which has developed from the common law concepts of
fraud and deceit. As a result, Rule 1Ob-5 can be extremely useful to
the investor.
C. State Securities Regulation
The state blue sky laws inject another crucial element into the
present group of investor protections. State blue sky registration
standards can affect all public real estate syndications because the
federal statute gives states the right to regulate all offers and sales of
securities within their jurisdiction. 135 More importantly, real estate
syndications frequently will seek an exemption from federal registra-
tion and register only at the state level because of the time, trouble
and expense involved at the federal level. 136
Even a brief look at state blue sky laws reveals a wide variety of
statutory regulation. Lack of uniformity is predominant, despite the
fact that 27 states have enacted versions of the Uniform Securities
Act. This lack of uniformity is even more pronounced in the rigor of
administrative implementation of the blue sky laws. For simplicity's
sake, this comment will present only the general regulatory pattern of
Washington whose securities laws are derived from the Uniform Act.
Blue sky laws in general present the syndicator with a different set
of problems than the federal securities laws.' 37 Where the federal
policy regulates by requiring full and accurate disclosure, the states
typically take a more paternalistic approach and require both disclo-
sure and an administrative evaluation of the offering to determine the
worthiness of an issue.138 The typical regulatory pattern has three fa-
cets: (1) registration of securities offered and sold in the state; (2) pro-
134. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968).
135. 15U.S.C.§ 77v(1970).
136. These syndications will take advantage of the intrastate exemption. See 15
U.S.C. § 77a(1 1) (1970).
137. Rooks, The Blue Sky of Washington: Registration of Securities of a New Ven-
ture, 6 GONZAGA L. REV. 187, 188 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rooks]. See also L. Loss
& E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW (1958) and Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Busi-
ness Promotions, 1969 DUKE LJ. 273.
138. Rooks, supra n'ote 137, at 187.
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hibitions of fraud and (3) registration of persons engaged in the selling
of securities. Registration provisions require all offers or sales of se-
curities to be registered1 39 unless specifically exempted. 140 Failure to
register can invoke civil and criminal liabilities.1 41 Once a registration
statement has been filed and 15 days have elapsed, the securities may
be offered and sold unless the administrator issues a stop order
denying registration or revoking the prior registration. The stop order
must be based upon a finding that the offering is adverse to the public
interest. The statute provides nine standards for assessing the public
interest. 42 The most important condition permits denial of a registra-
tion if "the offering has worked or is intended to work a fraud upon
purchasers or would so operate."'143 Fraud presumably will be inter-
preted broadly. 44 Additionally, the registration can be denied if there
are unreasonable amounts of underwriter and seller discounts, com-
missions, compensation, promoter profit or participation or unreason-
able amounts or kinds of options.145 Although these criteria require
administrative inquiry into specific aspects of the worthiness of a pro-
posed offering from an investor's point of view, they should not be
confused with the much broader "fair, just, and equitable" standard
which justifies inquiry into the financial or economic soundness of the
business itself.4M3 The typical state securities statute also provides fraud
protections similar to Rule lOb-5 and allows for rescission or dam-
ages. 147 The broker-dealer registration requirement provides little ad-
ditional protection for the investor. 48
The basic problem with blue sky regulation is that it provides flex-
ible standards which are only as effective as the state administrator's
investigation and scrutiny of each registration statement. Unfortunate-
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20,140 (1963). There are three methods of registration:
(I) notification (used for a new issue of an already registered business), WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.150 (1963); (2) coordination (used in cases where there has already been
federal registration), WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.180 (1963) and (3) qualification (used in
all other cases), WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.210 (1963).
140. There are two major exceptions. First, the isolated transaction and/or non-
public offering. Second, transactions which limit offer or sale of securities to not more
than 20 persons in any 12-month period. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.320(1) & (9) (1963).
141. See Rooks, supra note 137, at 196.
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.280 (1963).
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.280(5) (1963).
144. Rooks, supra note 137, at 206.
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.2.280(5) (1963).
146. See CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West 1968).
147. Rooks, supra note 137, at 206.
148. Registration is required by WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.040 (1963).
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ly, the universal characteristic of blue sky commissions is lack of funds
and staff. Because these fiscal restraints preclude the state administra-
tor from effectively administering present standards, state blue sky ad-
ministrators faced with specific problem areas such as real estate syn-
dications quite naturally turn to sets of substantive regulations in the
form of rules or guidelines issued under the administrator's rule-
making power. These substantive regulations substantially ease the
investigatory burden of the administrator for it is much easier to re-
quire conformity with a set of substantive standards than to make a
vague "public interest" determination under the existing regulatory
structure in each individual case. The adequacy of these substantive
standards with regard to real estate syndications will be discussed in
detail later in this comment.
III. PROPOSED CHANGES IN REGULATION
A. SEC Proposals: More and Better Disclosure
After a thorough study of real estate securities problems by a spe-
cially appointed Real Estate Advisory Committee, the SEC has re-
cently made the policy determination that protection for the real es-
tate syndicate investor can be best achieved through full and uniform
economic disclosure in real estate offerings. 149 Although this stance by
the SEC generally perpetuates past disclosure policy, to compensate
for past deficiencies there apparently will be significant changes in the
mode of disclosure. The goal of the SEC policy is to establish a per-
manent market for real estate securities within the existing capital
market system. 150 The SEC apparently views fragmented federal and
state regulation as a threat to this objective and seeks "consistency" of
regulation at the state and federal levels. 151 Whether such consistency
is possible in view of the SEC's exclusive reliance on regulation by
disclosure is open to question.
149. See Oct. 12, 1972, SEC REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT
[hereinafter cited as REAC REPORT] and account of address by former SEC Chairman
William J. Casey before the Colorado Bar Association, Oct. 13, 1972. [July-Dec.
1972 Transfer Binder] BNA SEC. REG. & L. REPORT No. 173 at A-1.
150. See account of statement of former SEC Chairman William J. Casey, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REPORTS, Special Report 451 at 2 (1972).
151. See note 149 supra. See also, REAC REPORT, supra note 149, Recommenda-
tion 9 (recommending abatement of state imposed regulations on compensation until
uniform regulation by disclosure has had a chance to be evaluated).
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The substance of the SEC's regulation will be a new "uniform pros-
pectus" to be used for all nationally distributed real estate securities.152
The uniform prospectus does not exist as of this writing, but it may
be assumed that the recommendations of the SEC's Real Estate Advi-
sory Committee will serve as the basis for the disclosure requirements
of the new prospectus. The new uniform prospectus should require a
"numerical economic analysis" of the potential consequences of par-
ticipation in a particular real estate program based upon "'standard as-
sumptions" to aid the investor in evaluating a syndicate. 15"3 This ap-
proach will probably necessitate specific projections of the cash flow
and tax shelter aspects of the real estate investment. In general, the
use of projections which allow the investor to see exactly what an in-
vestment should bring would be a pronounced improvement over the
present Form S- 11,15 at least insofar as specific property syndications
are concerned.
The recommendations further provide that the new prospectus
should require investor-oriented disclosure in other real estate
problem areas. There should be "a clear exposition of the real and
potential conflicts of interest that may be involved in the sale of the
securities, the use of the proceeds, and the arrangement of the prop-
erties purchased."'155 The registrant should be required to include a
"summary of each type of transaction in which an affiliate may en-
gage with the registrant, and the manner of resolving conflicts."' 56
Syndicator compensation should be regulated by "appropriate disclo-
sure which will assume that the reasonableness of the fees will be
self-policed by competitive market forces.' 57 The prospectus should
require "a summary disclosure in one section of all direct and indirect
compensation payable by the partnership to promoters, general part-
ners, underwriters and their affiliates."'158
The Advisory Committee recommendations include several as-
sorted disclosure requirements designed specifically for "speculative"
real estate syndicates. The requirements include: a statement in the
prospectus that the investment is intended for investors in or above a
152. See REAC REPORT, supra note 149. Recommendation 13.
153. Id., Recommendation 14.
154. See text accompanying notes 107-19 supra.
155. See REAC REPORT, supra note 149. Recommendation 7.
156. Id., Recommendation 3.
157. Id., Recommendation 9.
158. Id., Recommendation 10.
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certain tax bracket;159 a summary in the prospectus of the experience
of the general partner or promoter in previous public limited partner-
ships, including an indication of "the investment by promoters and
others and the return on such investment and compensation
received .... -160 and approval of all sales literature by the SEC
prior to use.161 While recognition of the need for special requirements
for "speculative" real estate syndicates is a step in the right direction,
it is questionable whether these few special disclosure requirements
would adequately protect the investor.
The general recommendations of the Real Estate Advisory Com-
mittee must be implemented before it will be possible to evaluate fully
the effectiveness of the proposals: If the Committee's recommenda-
tions are followed, however, it is apparent that many of the confusing
and deficient disclosure practices present in the Form S-11 will be
eliminated. As discussed later, even considering these proposed im-
provements in the disclosure requirements, the SEC is subject to se-
rious criticism for perpetuating its policy of regulation solely by dis-
closure for all types of real estate syndications.
B. State Proposals: More Substantive Regulation
As a reaction to the problems posed by real estate syndications,
several state securities administrators have recently promulgated or
are in the process of promulgating rules or policy statements con-
cerning real estate limited partnerships. 162 The Washington Rules on
159. Id., Recommendation 18.
160. Id., Recommendation 21. Additional requirements for speculative syndicates
include: (1) full disclosure of the economic ard tax benefits of participation in the pro-
gram and the risk inherent in such programs; (2)a-balance sheet of promoters and general
partners; (3) disclosure of business failures, bank rtcy or insolvency involving the
general partner or promoter in the past ten years plus disclosure of violations of state
and federal securities laws and (4) disclosure of all accounting practices to be used.
161. Id., Section 2. "[A] 11 literature not filed or approved will be prohibited."
162. The new California Real Estate Syndication Rules, filed on April 10, 1973, and
effective 30 days thereafter, adopt extensive substantive regulation. Included are
provisions governing the experience and net worth of the general partner, investor suita-
bility standards, limits on syndicator compensation, prohibitions on conflicts of interest,
requirements guaranteeing increased control for limited partners and new disclosure
requirements. See 10 CAL. AD. CODE § 260.140.110 et seq. (1973). The California
Rules were adopted after lengthy discussion with the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioner's Association, the NASD and the SEC's Real Estate Advisory Committee. The
background and basic structure of the new California Rules are discussed in an article
by the California Commissioner of Corporations, Van Camp, Living With Tax Shelters
in California: A Discussion of the New California Real Estate Syndication Rules,
7 U.S.F. L. REv. 403 (1973).
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Limited Partnerships1 6 3 and the recently adopted Guidelines of the
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association 164 will differ signifi-
cantly from basic blue sky regulation by imposing both strict disclosure
requirements and substantive restrictions on real estate syndications.'" 5
Although the substantive regulations are designed to protect the inves-
tor, and many will be flexibly applied as the circumstances dictate,
some rules will be rigidly enforced and may have substantial impact
on the future of real estate syndications. It is therefore necessary to
closely examine these substantive restrictions.
1. Syndicator Compensation
A major area of substantive regulation of real estate limited part-
nerships is syndicator compensation. The Midwest Guidelines start
with the general admonition that except for subordinated promotional
interests, compensation may only be paid by the partnership for "rea-
sonable and necessary" goods, property or services.' 66 More specifi-
cally, the Midwest Guidelines would limit syndication front end load
to some degree. The "acquisition fee" normally taken in the form of a
163. WASH. AD. CODE § 460-32-010 et seq. (1972); [Current] BLUE SKY L. REP.-
WASH. 50. 611 et seq. [hereinafter cited as Washington Rules].
There is some doubt whether the Washington Rules are a valid exercise of the State
Securities Administrator's rule making power. The preamble, § 460-32-0 10. states that
offering circulars "shall contain" certain specified provisions. Since the provisions will
require many substantive requirements, it can be argued that the administrator has ex-
ceeded his authority. Cases like Marble v. Clein, 55 Wn. 2d 315, 317-18, 347 P.2d 830.
831 (1959), state that the Securities Act must be strictly construed and not be "extended
beyond its plain terms." But see Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles. 81 Wn.
2d 155, 500 P.2d 540(1972).
164. Midwest Securities Commissioner's Association, Statement of Policy Re-
garding Real Estate Programs, [Current] BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 4821 (adopted Feb. 28.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Midwest Guidelines]. The Midwest Guidelines represent the
consensus of opinion of the administrators of the states who comprise the membership of
the Midwest Securities Commissioner's Association and are a policy statement only.
They are not binding on an individual member state unless expressly adopted by the
state. Washington is a member of the Association. (California has adopted rules which
substantially conform to the Midwest Guidelines. See note 162 supra.).
165. Generally states have followed the pattern of regulation set out in the above
description of Blue Sky regulation. See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
New York has had special statutory coverage of real estate syndications since 1961.
See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(e) (McKinney 1968) and Real Estate Syndication Offer-
ings regulations [Current] BLUE SKY L. REP.-N.Y. 35,611 etseq..The first to deal spe-
cifically with real estate syndications, this legislation regulates syndication offerings
with strict disclosure requirements. The most significant aspect of the statute is that it
gives the New York Attorney General the power to disapprove blind pool syndication
offerings. Since 1961 most such offerings in New York have not been approved.
166. Midwest Guidelines. supra note 164, IV A 2.
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real estate commission is permitted only for services actually rendered
and is limited to the lesser of comparable fees charged in similar
transactions or eighteen percent of the gross proceeds of the offering.
Moreover, the sum of the purchase price of the property plus the ac-
quisition fee cannot exceed the fair market value of the property as
established by an independent appraisal. 167 Organization and offering
expenses are allowed to the extent that they are reasonable and
comply with state restrictions. 168 Washington would permit a standard
real estate commission paid to the promoters when property is pur-
chased by the partnership, 169 and does not mention organizational
expenses.
Management fees are limited by the Midwest Guidelines to one
quarter of one percent of the cost of the unimproved land and to two
percent of the original cost of the land for improved property.170 All
other management fees are prohibited. Washington would "presume
to be reasonable" management fees of one percent of cost for unim-
proved land and three to seven per ent of gross proceeds per year for
improved property.171 No management fee limitation is meaningful,
however, without a limitation on fees paid to affiliates for management
and operation of the property. Washington imposes a flat prohibition
on payment to any affiliate in which the general partner has a five per-
cent or greater interest "unless fully disclosed to the investor."' 72 The
Midwest Guidelines require the syndicator or affiliate to have related
business experience and limit charges to "competitive" rates; more-
over, all other services rendered by the syndicator or affiliate must be
embodied in the contract which can be modified only by a majority
vote of the limited partners and can be terminated without penalty
on 60 days notice.' 7 3
167. Id., IV C 4.
... the lesser of such compensation customarily charged in arms' length transac-
tions by others rendering similar services as an ongoing public activity in the same
geographical location and for comparable property or an amount equal to 18% of
the gross proceeds of the offering.
168. Id., IV C 4.
169. Washington Rules, supra note 163, § 460-32-100(2).
170. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164, IV D. The use of the project cost as the
basis for determining management fees does not seem rational since the cost is not ne-
cessarily related to management efforts or the income from which the management fee
should be paid.
171. Washington Rules, supra note 163, § 460-32-090.
172. Id.
173. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164, V E 3. Whether such a vote by the limited
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Promotional interests of syndicators are also severely restricted. 7 4
The Midwest Guidelines are the most stringent, allowing promotional
interests only to the extent that they are "reasonable." 175 The promo-
tional interest is presumed to be reasonable if it is equal to: (1)
twenty-five percent of undistributed amounts remaining after all cap-
ital contributions have been paid to each investor, (2) ten percent of
distributions from cash available for distribution or (3) fifteen percent
of the distributions to investors after payment of an amount equal to
one hundred percent of capital contributions plus an amount equal to
six percent of capital contributions per annum cumulative less the sum
of prior distributions to investors.' 76 Washington simply subordinates
the syndicator's promotional interest for purposes of distributions of
capital for the duration of the partnership and presumes that a promo-
tional interest in excess of twenty percent of the net profits is unrea-
sonable.' 77 Although both provisions seem fair to the investor, the
Midwest Guidelines can be construed with greater certainty.
Both the Midwest Guidelines and the Washington Rules further
limit syndicator profit by proscribing various potential conflicts of in-
terest. The Midwest Guidelines prohibit the following: (1) sales or
leases to the syndicator except for a total, guaranteed leaseback; (2)
loans to the syndicator; (3) dealings with related syndicates; 78 (4) es-
clusive listing agreements; (5) commissions on reinvestment of pro-
ceeds of resale, exchange or refinancing; 79 (6) insurance brokerage
fees by the syndicator1 80 and (7) investments in other syndicates.' 81
The Midwest Guidelines also prohibit the sale or lease to the partner-
ship of property in which the syndicator has an interest except at for-
mation of the syndicate. 82 Even at this time the sale price cannot
partners will jeopardize their limited liability protections is open to question. See note
41 and accompanying text supra. However, as the purpose of this vote is to protect the
limited partners' interests and hence, indirectly, the creditors of the partnership, loss of
the limited liability protection is unlikely.
174. The Washington Rules define a promotional interest as one that is acquired by
the syndicator for other than cash and/or property. Washington Rules. supra note 163. §
460-32-060.
175. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164, IV E.
176. Id., IV E 1-2.
177. Washington Rules, supra note 163, §§ 460-32-060-070.
178. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164. V A 2-4.
179. Id.,VC&VD.
180. Id., V E I.
181. Id., V I.
182. Id., V A 1.
174
Vol. 49: 137, 1973
Real Estate Syndications
exceed fair market value as established by an independent appraisal.1 83
Washington allows the sale of property to the syndicate in which the
syndicator has an interest if the syndicator has owned or has been ob-
ligated to purchase the property for six months prior to the filing of
the registration and has paid consideration (other than an option or
earnest money) toward the principal. 84 The price cannot exceed fair
market value as established by an appraisal, and if the sale price ex-
ceeds ninety percent of the appraised value, the syndicator can be
compensated only by a promotional interest in the partnership in the
amount of the excess.' 8 5
Neither set of regulations questions -the propriety of real estate
commissions for syndicators. Yet the conflict of interest inherent in
these commissions (the higher the cost of the property, the higher the
commission) should not be ignored. It would make more sense to re-
quire that front end syndicator compensation be measured by the
amount of money raised, rather than the cost of the property pur-
chased by the syndicate. In sum, both the Midwest Guidelines and the
Washington Rules take significant steps towards limiting syndicator
compensation by substantive regulation.
2. Investor Control
Both the Midwest Guidelines and the Washington Rules increase
the participation of investors in the control of limited partnerships.
The Midwest Guidelines permit ten percent of the limited partners to
call general meetings by initiative. To the extent consistent with state
law, the limited partners by a majority vote can amend the partner-
ship agreement, dissolve the limited partnership, remove the general
partner or approve or disapprove the sale of all or substantially all of
the assets of the partnership. 8 6 On the other hand, the Washington
183. Id. Moreover, any increase in the sales price above the actual cost to the syndi-
cation is deemed unfair unless there has been some "material change," such as the pas-
sage of two or more years or the syndicator taking the risk of getting the property re-
zoned. Id., V A I c.
184. Washington Rules, supra note 163, § 460-32-100.
185. Id. There is nothing sacred about appraisals. Different appraisers can arrive at
different appraisals of the same property. See, e.g., Northwest Chemurgy Securities Co.
v. Chelan County, 38 Wn. 2d 87, 228 P.2d 129 (1951) (In a dispute over an assessed
valuation of $110,800 for tax purposes, three appraisers used as expert witnesses made
value estimates of $30,000, $40,000 and $86,240 on the same piece of property.)
186. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164, VII B.
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Rules require thirty percent of the limited partnership interests to call
a general meeting. 187 Limited partners can vote to dissolve the syndi-
cate by removing the general partner, 188 to readjust management fees
(if so provided in the partnership agreement) 89 or to accept or reject
proposed buyers of a corporate general partner's interest,""' but all
such votes require a sixty-six percent majority."' The Washington
Rules permit voting by proxy.
Provision for increased limited partner control over the general
partner is a step forward. To make this power meaningful, however,
the limited partner must be kept up to date with complete and accu-
rate information. Yet Washington requires only that the general
partner provide each limited partner with an annual certified audit
and a copy of the syndicate's federal income tax return. 92 The Mid-
west Guidelines have somewhat more stringent informational require-
ments. Beyond requiring that all partnerships supply limited partners
with an annual report plus the federal tax returns," )3 a report is re-
quired after the first six months of partnership operation. J 4 and all
partnerships registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 are required to submit detailed quarterly reports." :' 5 The
Midwest Guidelines require quarterly reports by blind pool syndicates
until all funds are invested.'":)6 Of special importance, the Midwest
Guidelines require that whenever the general partner receives fees
for services, including acquisition fees, then a report detailing the ser-
vices rendered and the amount of fees received must be sent to all lim-
ited partners within 60 days after the end of the quarter during which
the fees were paid.'" 7 Such timely information regarding an area with
enormous potential for abuse should make the limited partners' vot-
ing power even more meaningful.
187. Washington Rules, supra note 163, § 460-32-050.
188. Id., § 460-32-050.
189. Id., § 460-32-090(1)-(2).
190. Id., § 460-32-050.
191. Id.
192. Id., § 460-32-180.
193. Midwest Guidelines, VII C 3-4.
194. Id., VII C 2.
195. Id., VII C 1.
196. Id., VI E.
197. Id., VI E 6.
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3. Investor Suitability Standards
The Midwest Guidelines impose a variety of investor suitability
standards. The syndicator is given some discretion in determining the
suitability standards for the real estate syndication. Where the syndi-
cate is designed to maximize tax advantages, the investor must be in a
high tax bracket and have a high net worth.' 9 8 ;A duty is imposed on
the syndicator to investigate investors' 99 and to maintain records on
the investors.2 00 The minimum investment for a "low risk" syndicate
is $2500; $5000 is required for high risk syndicates. 201 Washington
does not tequife suitability standards.
4. Disclosure Requirements.
Strict disclosure provisions dominate both the Washington Rules
and the Midwest Guidelines. Specific requirements are too numerous
to list in detail. The Midwest Guidelines permit, but do not require,
projections of future results.2 02 Since these projections are designed to
help the investor see what the syndicate will mean to him, they "shall
be realistic in their predictions and shall clearly identify the assump-
tions made with respect to all material features of the presentation. '203
Since the projection must be made for ten years into the future or to
the planned termination date of the syndicate, whichever is shorter,204
the early year tax benefits should not be overemphasized. More gen-
eral projections, such as disclosure of the occupancy rate required to
break even, also must be included.205 Although the Midwest Guide-
lines prohibit projections for unimproved land,2 06 the Washington
Rules have no such restrictions.
5. Special Treatment of Blind Pools
Unlike the Washington Rules which do not differentiate between
198. Id., IIIA.
199. Id., III B 1-2.
200. Id., III C.
201. Id., III D.
202. Id., VIII D 1.
203. Id., VIII D I a.
204. Id., VIII D 1 d(1).
205. Id., VIII D 1 b(4).
206. Id., VIII D 2.
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specific property and blind pool syndications, the Midwest Guidelines
isolate blind pool syndications for special treatment. Beyond the re-
quirement that blind pools make quarterly reports to the limited part-
ners until all funds are invested, 20 7 the Midwest Guidelines contain a
number of specific requirements. The blind pool limited partnership
must have a minimum of $1,000,000 of paid-in capital after all mar-
keting and organizational expenses,208 the offering period is limited to
one year, and all proceeds not invested within two years of the date of
effectiveness must be returned to the investors. 20:) Blind pool syndica-
tors must have a higher level of experience than specific property syn-
dicators; moreover, the size and scope of projects undertaken by such
syndicators cannot exceed their experience. 210
Unfortunately, the Midwest Guidelines do not differentiate between
blind pool and specific property syndicates in the area of syndicator
compensation. It is arguable that the various economies inherent in a
blind pool syndication 211 justify tighter restrictions on compensation.
By lumping both types of syndication under one regulatory scheme,
the Midwest Guidelines may unnecessarily deter specific property
syndications (because the greater risks may not be adequately com-
pensated) and may correspondingly encourage blind pool syndica-
tions.
Taken together, the Midwest Guidelines and the Washington Rules
markedly increase the substantive regulation of real estate syndica-
tions. These new regulations should benefit the investor by limiting
syndicator power and profit. Unfortunately, the Midwest Guidelines
and the Washington Rules often seek to accomplish the same goals by
widely different means, resulting in inconsistent and often irreconcilable
restrictions. For example, the Midwest Guidelines require only a ma-
jority vote to dissolve a limited partnership while Washington requires
a two-thirds vote.212 Such inconsistent restrictions may prohibit syndi-
207. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
208. Midwest Guidelines, supra note 164, VI A.
209. Id., VI D.
210. Id., VI B. The Midwest Guidelines require "not less than four years relevant ex-
perience" for real estate syndicators in general (Id., II A). but "not less than five years
experience in the real estate business in an executive capacity and two years experience
in the management acquisition of the type of property to be acquired..." for blind pool
syndicates (unless the syndicator can convince the state securities administrator that he
has sufficient experience otherwise). Id., VI B.
211. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
212. See text accompanying notes 186 & 191 supra.
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cates from registering in a large number of states and may hinder the
development of a national real estate syndicate market.213 Nonethe-
less, the various proposals for substantive regulation reflect a recogni-
tion of the pressing need for increased protection of investors in real
estate limited partnerships.
IV. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE
REGULATION
A. Can Regulation Solely by Disclosure Be Justified?
As discussed above, the states are moving in the direction of more
substantive regulation of real estate syndications. Given the SEC's
recent policy decision to continue to regulate real estate syndications
by disclosure only, the much sought-after goal of "consistency" of
state and federal regulation seems less and less attainable. The diver-
gent paths of state and federal regulation may yet meet, however, for
the SEC has recognized that substantive regulation of real estate syn-
dications may be unavoidable.
While the SEC's Advisory Committee specifically asserted that the
real estate limited partnership should continue to be exempted from
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (which contains provisions for
substantive regulation),2 14 both the Committee's report and the state-
ments of (then) SEC Chairman Casey make it clear that if uniform
disclosure does not adequately protect the investor, investment com-
pany-type regulation will be imposed.215 This recognition by the SEC
that substantive regulation may be necessary invites a comparison of
the problems which precipitated investment company substantive reg-
213. This same problem of a multiplicity of variant state restrictions plagued the
development of the real estate investment trust. See generally Armstrong, An Attor-
ney's Viewpoint, 48 VA. L. REV. 1082 (1962).
214. See REAC REPORT, supra note 149, Recommendations 11-12. The Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1970), places numerous substantive restrictions
on the operation of investment companies. (For a list of the abuses which necessitated
the Act see notes 216-21 infra) For example, conflicts of interest and self-dealing are
tightly restricted (id., § 80a-10), and investor control over management is bolstered
(id., 80a-8(b) (1)).
In addition, when the SEC published the revised NASD proposals for public com-
mentary (see note 230 infra), the Commission specifically requested comment on the
following question:
3. Should the regulation of issues of these programs be achieved through a com-
prehensive federal regulatory program rather than NASD rulemaking?
215. See REAC REPORT, supra note 149.
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ulation and, more recently, proposals for the substantive regulation of
oil and gas limited partnerships with the problems of real estate syndi-
cations. Justification for the SEC's differing approach to regulation of
investment companies and oil and gas limited partnerships by substan-
tive regulation and regulation of real estate syndications by disclosure
alone should be based upon significant distinctions between the
problems presented by each type of investment. Yet, upon examina-
tion, it is apparent that no such significant distinctions exist.
1. A Comparison with Past and Present A buses
The abuses which precipitated enactment of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 are markedly similar to the abuses rampant in real
estate syndication today. 216 First, there was little or no control over
management once an investor had made his investment. The problem
stemmed not from the centralized management of funds, which is in-
herent in the investment company concept, but rather from the fact
that control was not exercised for the benefit of the fund and the
investors.21 7 Real estate limited partnerships face the same problem of
divorce of the investor's interest from control.218 Second, conflicts of
interest were rampant in the investment company industry. For exam-
ple, the organizers who controlled the investment companies were fre-
quently large brokerage houses which used the investment company to
their own advantage. 21 9 Real estate syndications are similarly plagued
with conflicts of interest and self-dealing. Third, investment compa-
nies were charged excessive management fees and other hidden fees.22 0
Real estate syndicates are subject to the same abuses. Finally, con-
gressional awareness of pyramiding and excessive financial power
gave further impetus for regulation of investment companies,2 2' a
factor currently not present with real estate syndications.
In summary, three of the four abuses which led to the enactment of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 are present in modern real es-
216. See Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L. REV. 77. 84
(1940) [hereinafter cited as Tolins].
217. Id. at 85.
218. The limited partnership form of organization may make the problem of
investor control more acute.
219. Tolins. stupra note 216, at 86.
220. Id. at 89-90.
221. Id.at87-89.
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tate syndications. Far from justifying a policy of regulation solely by
disclosure, this similarity in problems leads to the conclusion that sub-
stantive regulation might also be appropriate for real estate syndica-
tions.222
The SEC's recently proposed legislation for the regulation of oil
and gas programs 223 raises further questions relating to the lack of
substantive regulation of real estate syndications. Oil and gas pro-
grams and real estate syndications are both used as tax shelter invest-
ments and both normally take the form of a limited partnership.
Again, the problems necessitating regulation of oil and gas limited
partnerships are strikingly similar to the problems which presently
plague real estate syndications. These problems include: (1) the invest-
ment is offered as a tax-sheltered speculation to investors without re-
gard to thg investor's suitability; (2) arrangements for management of
oil companies almost always involve elements of self-dealing and
other conflicts of interest; (3) "The multiplicity of complex methods of
compensating managers of oil programs make it practically impossible
for investors to make meaningful comparisons and, in some cases,
such methods appear to provide for high compensation to managers in
relation to the risk they, as opposed to public investors, assume"2 24
and (4) "by use of 'redemption' or repurchase features, installment
plans, and increasingly lower minimum investments, many of the pro-
grams have some characteristics of traditional mutual funds. '225 The
SEC's proposed statute increases investor protections by providing
specific controls to prevent conflicts of interest and unfair transactions
between oil programs and their managers, and by insuring that pro-
gram managers are financially responsible.226
222. Perhaps the SEC's reluctance to impose investment company-type regulations
on real estate limited partnerships is due in part to the unsuccessful attempts by several
states to use this type of regulation on real estate investment trusts in the early 1960's.
This regulation proved to be unworkable for two reasons: (1) the severe restrictions
removed the incentive to use real estate investment trusts, and (2) different state
standards made blue sky qualification extremely burdensome, if not impossible. See
generally Sobieski, State Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts-the
Midwest Position, 48 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1962); Armstrong, An Attorney's Viewpoint,
48 VA. L. REV. 1082 (1962).
223. SEC PROPOSED LEGISLATION, REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS PROGRAMS, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Report 428 (Jan. 19, 1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC
PROPOSED LEGISLATION].
224. See SEC ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR OIL AND GAS INVESTMENT
ACT OF 1972, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., Special Report 428 at 7 (Jan. 19, 1972).
See also SEC PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 223, § 1.
225. Id.
226. Id., § 18.
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The proposed bill also provides for greater investor participation.
Changes in fundamental policy must be approved by the holders of
program participations 227 and the program manager must function
under a written contract which must be approved by program partici-
pants.2 28 Significantly, the bill gives the National Association of Secur-
ities Dealers (NASD) specific regulatory authority over sales literature,
sales charges and suitability and classification of management com-
pensation. The proposed statute does not provide for SEC or NASD
regulation of management compensation other than through full and
accurate disclosure.22 :)
2. The NASD Begins Substantive Regulation
In the background of both the newly announced SEC policy con-
cerning real estate limited partnerships and the SEC's proposed Regu-
lation of Oil and Gas Programs is the NASD's revised proposed Regu-
lations for Tax Sheltered Programs.2 30 These proposed tax shelter
program regulations are to become part of the NASD's Rules of Fair
Practice and are designed to prohibit NASD members from under-
writing or participating in the distribution of any tax sheltered pro-
gram which does not meet prescribed standards of reasonableness and
fairness.2 3 ' Because the marketing, and perhaps even the underwrit-
ing, of a national syndicate offering requires utilization of NASD
members,2 32 the proposed rules will have a substantial impact on real
227. Id., § 10.
228. Id., § 13.
229. Id., § 19a.
230. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC., TAX SHELTER PRO-
GRAMS, Proposed Rules of Fair Practice. Art. III, § 33 [hereinafter cited as NASD
Proposed Rules]. Revised Proposed Rules were recently published for public scrutiny
and comment by the SEC. See Securities Act Release No. 10260 (July 2. 1973).
[Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,417. For a good analysis (outdated because
of the recent revisions) of the NASD proposals and Midwest Guidelines, see Comment.
Proposed Regulation of Linited Partnership Investment Programs, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
465, 474-85 (1973).
231. NASD Proposed Rules, supra note 230.
232. Besides registration of brokers and dealers pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970). primary SEC control of over-the-counter brokers
and dealers is through the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The
NASD is an association of over-the-counter brokers and dealers authorized under the
Maloney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780, designed to regulate members on an ethical level. "to
protect the investor and the honest dealer alike from dishonest and unfair practices by
the submarginal element of the industry." and "to cope with those methods of doing
business which while technically outside the area of illegality, are nonetheless unfair to
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estate syndication to the extent that they become binding on NASD
members.
The NASD proposed rules impose a number of substantive restric-
tions. The proposed rules require that the issuer have a minimum level
of experience in real estate233 and that the general partner have a min-
imum net worth.234 The syndicate can reinvest distributable cash flow
in subsequent programs only after participants are given the option to
receive cash.235 Limited partners (investors) are given the right to
remove the sponsor, to amend the partnership agreement, to dissolve
the partnership or to approve or disapprove the sale of all or substan-
tially all of the assets of the program.236
The proposed rules treat conflicts of interest extensively, 23 7 dividing
them into two groups: those which are permissible subject to regula-
tion and those which are impermissible. Permissible conflicts subject
to regulation include sales of property, supplies, services and equip-
ment furnished by the general partner to the syndicate. Property
which is owned by the general partner and is sold to the syndicate
must, with certain exceptions, 238 be sold at cost or fair market value,
whichever is less, regardless of when the general partner purchased the
property. Where the general partner furnishes services, supplies, equip-
ment or other property to the syndicate, the fees and prices must be
either competitive with similar fees in the area,23:) or contributed at
cost (if there is no basis for comparing the fees or prices).2 40
the customer and the decent competitor." 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 763 (1951)
(quoting from legislative history of the Maloney Act). NASD self-regulation is closely
supervised by the SEC.
The NASD has a significant degree of power over its members. NASD rules require
members to treat nonmember brokers and dealers the same way members of the public
are treated. Since members give each other benefits of special discounts in ordinary
trading, incentive to obtain and keep membership is quite high. It is virtually impossible
for a dealer who is not a member of the NASD to participate in a distribution of any
size. Id. at 770.
The NASD rules require elaborate policing provisions and disciplinary procedures.
233. NASD Proposed Rules, supra note 230, Appendix B, §2(a).
234. Id., § 2(b).
235. Id., § 2(q).
236. Id., § 3(a) (1-4). However the availability of these rights is conditioned upon
the absence of an adverse effect on the participant's limited liability.
237. Id., § 4.
238. Id., § 4(a) (1) (a-b). The property can be sold to the syndicate at more than cost
if the syndicator owned the property for more than one year prior to the formation of
the syndicate or there has been a material change of the value of the property since it
was acquired.




Impermissible conflicts of interest prohibit the general partner from
being the principal or prime tenant of property owned by the syndi-
cate,2 41 prevent the sale or exchange of any property between syndi-
cates with the same general partner 242 and prohibit sales by the gen-
eral partner of a blind pool syndicate of any services or property un-
less it is fully disclosed in the prospectus. 243 Additionally, the pro-
posed rules require adherence to investor suitability standards.244 Of-
fering, organizational and management expenses for the first year are
limited to fifteen percent of the cash receipts of the offering.2 45 Limited
use of projections is permitted, 246 but the content of these projections
is standardized, requiring a "Distributable Cash Flow Statement," a
"Tax Statement" and a "Combined Cash Flow and Tax Statement.
247
The proposed rules do not permit illustrations unless reliable data are
available.2 48
Because continued NASD membership is crucial to members, fairly
close adherence to the proposed rules can be expected.2 49 NASD disci-
plinary proceedings can result from discrepancies discovered in NASD
inspections or from general complaints. (An adverse determination by
the NASD can mean suspension or revocation of membership.) Of
equal importance has been a trend toward imposing civil liability for
violation of NASD rules. 250
The NASD's proposed rules may be a significant supplement to
SEC regulation. Although the SEC has not approved the proposals as
of this writing, it regards the NASD regulations as supplements to its
own regulations.25 1 Yet to the extent that the NASD proposed rules
substantively affect real estate syndications, they are inconsistent with
the SEC's policy of regulation solely by disclosure.
241. Id., § 4(b)(l).
242. Id., § 4(b)(3).
243. Id., § 4(b)(5). The NASD uses the term "unspecified property program" in
place of "blind pool." The original NASD definition referred directly to "blind pool."
244. Id., § 5.
245. Id., § 6(a)(2).
246. Id., § 9(e).
247. Id., § 9(e)(l)(c).
248. Id., § 9(e)(l)(d-f).
249. See note 232 supra.
250. See, e.g., Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d
690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968) (broker held liable for fraud and negligence in violation of
NASD suitability rule). See also V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRLSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE
1086-89 (1972).
251. See notes 230 & 232 supra.
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It appears that state and private regulators are responding to the
problems in real estate syndication by moving in the direction of in-
creased substantive regulation. When confronted with similar prob-
lems in the areas of investment company and oil and gas program
regulation, the SEC also has responded with substantive regulation.
Given the fact that every regulatory agency other than the SEC is in-
creasing the substantive regulation of real estate syndications, the goal
of a consistent regulatory policy to guarantee access to the national
capital market will be unattainable so long as the SEC adheres to its
policy of regulation solely by disclosure.
B. The Prime Candidate for Federal Substantive Regulation: Blind
Pool Syndications
The basic differences between specific property and blind pool real
estate syndicates are ignored by the SEC's current policy of real estate
syndication regulation solely by disclosure. In contrast with specific
property syndications for which disclosure alone seems generally ade-
quate, blind pool syndications seem especially amenable to federal
substantive regulation.
Blind pools markedly resemble investment companies which are
already subject to federal substantive regulation. Both enable a
number of investors to pool their funds in order to reap the benefit of
intelligent investment in a diversified portfolio of securities or prop-
erty. Both allow an ordinary investor without the time, finances or
expertise to participate in the securities or real estate markets. In gen-
eral, blind pool syndicates are subject to the same kinds of abuses
which necessitated substantive regulation of investment companies.
Regulation of blind pools by disclosure alone seems destined to be
inadequate. Because property is not owned when the initial offering is
made, the required projections which are the key to SEC disclosure
policy for real estate limited partnerships are not possible with a blind
pool syndicate. Increased disclosure of the types of investment prop-
erty can be meaningless. 252 Further, no additional disclosure of prior
experience or net worth beyond that required of specific property syn-
dicators is required of blind pool syndicators even though investors
are forced to rely more heavily on the syndicator's judgment.
252. See, e.g., note 114 supra.
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Because of the problems in their format, blind pools are beginning
to receive specialized substantive treatment from existing regulators.
The Midwest Guidelines place a number of special restrictions on
blind pools including a limited offering period, a minimum amount of
initial investment capital after marketing and organizational expenses,
a limited investment period after the capital is raised and provisions
for quarterly reports to the limited partners during this investment
period. The Proposed NASD Rules also contain special provisions for
"unspecified property programs." A blind pool syndicator is prohib-
ited from selling any service or any property to the syndicate unless it
was previously disclosed in the prospectus;2 53 blind pools can pay
management fees only from operating income;2 54 deferred subscrip-
tion plans255 and provisions for levying assessments2 56 are flatly pro-
hibited. The newly adopted California Real Estate Syndication Rules
impose special substantive requirements upon blind pool syndicators,
such as prior experience standards. 257 Clearly, the trend is toward
recognizing the special characteristics of blind pools. 2 58
Currently most of the real estate syndicates which register with the
SEC are blind pools. 2 59 Special treatment of blind pools by the SEC
would have an immediate national impact. Indeed, to avoid abdi-
cating meaningful regulation of real estate syndications to the patch-
work state regulatory schemes, the SEC may find it necessary to re-
evaluate its policy of regulating blind pool syndications solely by
disclosure.
253. NASD Proposed Rules, supra note 230, § 4(b)(5).
254. Id., § 7(a)(9).
255. Id., § 2(h).
256. Id., § 2(k).
257. 10 CAL. AD. CODE § 260.140.115(2) (1973). See note 162 supra.
258. Despite this special treatment, both the proposed NASD Rules and the Mid-
west Guidelines are subject to criticism for failure to differentiate between blind pool
and specific property syndicates in other areas as well. The NASD's 15% limit on or-
ganization and offering expenses applies to both kinds of syndicate. (See note 245 and
accompanying text supra.) The Midwest Guidelines likewise fail to account for the
economies inherent in blind pools when establishing arbitrary limits in syndicator com-
pensation. (See text accompanying note 211 supra.) The previous experience and net
worth minimums set by the NASD for syndicators are the same regardless of the type of
syndication being offerred. (See note 210 and accompanying text supra.)
259. See Nov., 1972, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION DIGEST 3-19 for a listing of recent
real estate syndications.
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CONCLUSION
The only concensus that can be gathered from this maze of propos-
als, rules and reports is that there are serious problems with existing
methods of regulating real estate syndication. The real estate limited
partnership presents substantial problems for the regulator. Reducing
the many opportunities for self-dealing and conflicts of interest and
forcing a syndicator to offer an investor a prospectus with a balance
between tax shelter and economic soundness is not an easy regulatory
task. Moreover, the substantial need for such regulation is under-
scored by two factors which inhibit the ability of the investor to fend
for himself-lack of transferability and the lack of investor control in-
herent in limited partnership interests.
Existing disclosure requirements seem largely ineffectual in com-
batting the problems in real estate syndications. Typically, neither the
investor nor the investment adviser can make much sense out of the
prospectus. Most if not all syndicate offerings are new offerings with
no past business history to rely upon. When projections are not per-
mitted or a business history is not available, the investor is left to con-
sider numerous and confusing "risk" factors, the claimed "quality"
and "value" of the project and incomprehensible disclosures con-
cerning syndicator compensation. The high risk factors, especially
those relating to the tax aspects of the syndicate, can add to this con-
fusion by being construed to be selling points for the syndicate..
Specific proposals to substantively regulate real estate limited part-
nerships, though properly motivated, inevitably create some problems.
Regulation of syndicator compensation is a very troublesome issue,
especially when arbitrary lines are drawn. Nevertheless, some aspects
of substantive regulation, including increased control for limited part-
ners and outright proscriptions of certain conflicts of interest, can only
be viewed as beneficial.
Perhaps the major problem posed by substantive regulation of real
estate limited partnerships is the multiplicity of standards being devel-
oped by different regulators. Where the NASD and the several states
require compliance with diverse substantive provisions governing the
syndicate offering, qualification in all states may become burdensome
and expensive, if not impossible. 60 In addition, substantive regulation
260. Unlike the normal corporate offering, where most states allow registration by
coordination when the corporation has registered with the SEC, real estate syndications
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can conflict with the SEC's policy of regulation solely by disclosure.
Because the divergent patterns of regulation decrease the chances of
achieving nationwide access to the capital market for real estate secur-
ities, the SEC's proposal that all parties concerned with the regulation
of real estate syndications get together and work out a "consistent"
policy of regulation makes eminent sense.261
The SEC's policy decision to regulate real estate syndications exclu-
sively by disclosure must be seriously questioned however. There is a
marked inconsistency between this pronounced exclusive disclosure
policy and the SEC's support of substantive NASD regulation. Fur-
ther, the SEC's response to similar problems in the investment com-
pany and oil and gas limited partnership areas has been substantive
regulation.
It seems particularly inconsistent for the SEC not to substantively
regulate blind pool syndicates. Projections are typically meaningless
with blind pools because no property is owned when the offering is
made and existing disclosure requirements are easily circumvented.
Because the eventual success or failure of a blind pool depends upon
the background and experience of the general partner, strict disclo-
sure and substantive regulation of experience and net worth seems
necessary. In addition, blind pool syndications merit such substantive
investor protections as a limited offering period, minimum initial in-
vestment capital requirements and a limited investment period with
special quarterly reports to the limited partners.
While the Midwest Guidelines accord blind pools special treatment
as suggested above, most state blue sky commissions fail to differen-
tiate between blind pool and specific property syndications. Not rec-
ognizing these differences can unintentionally promote the use of blind
pool syndications, since a syndicator can often make more money
within the limits set by the state regulations by utilizing a blind pool
syndicate with its low organizational expenses and decreased risks.
The specific property syndicator whose compensation is unreasonably
restricted and whose organizational costs are extremely high, in part
will probably have to conform to the various substantive requirements of each state's
real estate limited partnership rules.
261. A start was apparently made for coordinating efforts to regulate real estate
syndications when a meeting of SEC staff, NASD officials and various state securities
regulators was held during the last week in December, 1972. See [July-Dec. 1972
Transfer Binder] BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Report No. 179.
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because of stringent disclosure requirements, may not be able to com-
pete with the blind pool syndicator.
It is clear that a consistent if not uniform policy of regulation of
real estate limited partnerships would be most advantageous. It is also
clear that the blind pool syndication, although similar in many ways
to the specific property syndication, presents unique problems for the
regulator. Because of these problems, the blind pool syndicate should
be specially regulated by the SEC and the states. Federal substantive
regulation seems appropriate.
The specific property syndication, on the other hand, is more ap-
propriately regulated solely by disclosure with the exception of certain
requirements for some degree of limited partner control over the gen-
eral partner and proscription of flagrant conflict of interest abuses.
The specific property syndication can present adequate descriptions of
the subject property, which is the basis of the value of the syndicate, 62
and can make fairly reliable projections of future earnings. Be-
cause the syndicator must generally present a similar analysis of the
virtues of the development to the primary lender, there appears to be
no reason why he cannot make projections to the investor in an un-
derstandable fashion. These projections should include a comprehen-
sive comparison of tax shelter, cash flow benefits and promoter com-
pensation. The SEC's requirement that projections be based on cer-
tain standard assumptions seems helpful, as does the Midwest Guide-
lines' requirement that the downside potential and consequences be
disclosed in the projection. In short, a combination of the best aspects
of the SEC, NASD and Midwest requirements would result in the dis-
closure of highly useful information to the investor. Regulation solely
by disclosure should allow the specific property syndication to con-
tinue to be an attractive method of financing real estate development.
Recognizing the basis distinctions between the blind pool syndica-
tion and the specific property syndication leads to the most rational
approach to regulation. Unfortunately, the SEC and many state secur-
262. One way of doing this is to require the opinion of an independent appraiser as
to the value of the property including a statement of the appraiser's assumptions and
factors which might lessen the value of the property. The appraiser's estimate of value
might include a final estimate and also a range of values and should state why the final
estimate was chosen. Since bare estimates of value can often be meaningless or mislead-
ing, this additional type of report is necessary, but not burdensome, as the typical ap-
praisal will include a detailed report by the appraiser.
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ities administrators treat the blind pool syndicate as the equivalent of
the specific property syndicate and regulate both in much the same
way. However, the practical differences between these two approaches
to syndication, the potential abuses of the blind pool syndicate and the
history of regulation of investment companies dictate a contrary con-
clusion.
Stephen B. Hazard*
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